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Abstract
We develop a general theory of intertemporal choice: the reference-time theory,
RT. RT is a synthesis of ideas from the generalized hyperbolic model (Loewenstein
and Prelec 1992), the quasi-hyperbolic model (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997)
and subadditivity of time discounting (Roelofsma and Read 2000, Read 2001 and
Scholten and Read 2006a). These models are extended to allow for (i) reference
points for time and wealth, and (ii) di⁄erent discount functions for gains and losses.
RT is able to account for all the 6 main anomalies of time discounting: gain-loss
asymmetry, magnitude e⁄ect, common di⁄erence e⁄ect, delay-speedup asymmetry,
apparent intransitivity of time preferences, and non-additivity of time discounting.
We provide a class of utility functions compatible with RT. We show how RT can be
extended to incorporate uncertainty and attribute models of intertemporal choice.
Keywords: Anomalies of the discounted utility model, Hyperbolic discounting,
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It is commonly believed that the exponential discounted utility model of intertemporal
choice (henceforth, EDU) is contradicted by a relatively large body of empirical and ex-
perimental evidence; see the survey by Frederick et al. (2002).1 Moreover, it appears that
these anomalies are not simply mistakes; see Frederick et al. (2002), section 4.3. If we
wish to develop models that provide a better explanation of economic behavior over time,
then it is imperative to take account of these anomalies. Furthermore, certain types of be-
havior, and several institutional features, can be explained by decision makers attempting
to deal with time-inconsistency problems that arise from non-exponential discounting; see,
for instance, Frederick et al. (2002), especially their section 5 titled ￿Alternative Models￿ .
1.1. Anomalies of intertemporal choice
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), henceforth ￿ LP￿ , described the following four anomalies,
all with good empirical support2:
1. Gain-loss asymmetry. Subjects in a study by Loewenstein (1988b) were, on average,
indi⁄erent between receiving $10 immediately and receiving $21 one year later (an
implied discount rate of 74% per annum3). They were also indi⁄erent between loosing
$10 immediately and losing $15 dollars one year later (an implied discount rate of
40:5% per annum). Note that this is a refutation of neoclassical economics for two
reasons. First, the implied discount rates are di⁄erent, second, they are both too
high (even allowing for capital market imperfections and liquidity constraints).
1Critical reviews can also be found in Andersen et al. (2007), Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Halevy
(2007), Manzini and Mariotti (2006), Noor (2008a,b), Ok and Masatlioglu (2007), Read (2001), Roelofsma
and Read (2000), Rubinstein (2003) and Scholten and Read (2006a, 2006b). For a recent overview, see
Manzini and Mariotti (2008).
2We use the same terminology as LP. However, gain-loss asymmetry is also known as the sign e⁄ect.
The common di⁄erence e⁄ect is also referred to as the delay e⁄ect or as preference reversal (we are grateful
to a referee for pointing this out). However, ￿ preference reversal￿is also used to describe (for example)
the following situation: A consumer strictly prefers bundle x to bundle y. But when a new bundle, z,
is introduced, the consumer now strictly prefers y to x. The latter phenomenon is a framing e⁄ect and
leads to violation of independence. The ￿ common di⁄erence e⁄ect￿need not be due to framing nor need it
lead to a violation of independence. See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Slovic (1991) and
Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade (1999). On this point, see also Manzini and Mariotti (2008, subsection
3.1).
3The estimated discount factor De is the ratio of current to future reward times the ratio of marginal
utilities. Assuming that the marginal utilities are approximately the same, the ratio of rewards is simply
used to approximate De: Thus, in this case, De = 10
21 = 0:47619: Assuming continuous compounding,
De ￿ D = e￿￿; where ￿ is the discount rate. Taking logs on both sides, ￿ = ￿lnDe; which in this case
is ￿ln(0:47619) = 0:74194, as claimed. The same method is used to report the other discount rates in
experiments, below. For critiques of this approach, see Noor (2008a,b).
12. Magnitude e⁄ect. Thaler (1981) reported that subjects were, on average, indi⁄erent
between receiving $15 immediately and $60 one year later (an implied discount rate of
139% per annum). They were also indi⁄erent between receiving $3000 immediately
and receiving $4000 one year later (an implied discount rate of 29% per annum).
This is a refutation because the implied discount rate is magnitude dependent and
is too high.
3. Common di⁄erence e⁄ect. Thaler (1981): A person might prefer one apple today
to two apples tomorrow (an implied real discount rate of 25300% per annum), but
at the same time prefer two apples in 51 days to one apple in 50 days (there is no
evidence that this is due to an expected change in the real discount rate).4
4. Delay-speedup asymmetry. Loewenstein (1988a) reported that, in general, the amount
required to compensate for delay in receiving a real reward by a given interval, from
s to s+t, was two to four times greater than what the subjects were willing to sacri-
￿ce to bring consumption forward from s + t to s. (Neo)classically, these quantities
should be the same.
Recent scholarship has added two further anomalies:
5. Non-additivity of time discounting. Discounting from time t back to time s then
further back to time r is not the same as discounting from time t back to time r in
one step (Read, 2001 and Scholten and Read, 2006a).
6. Intransitivity of time preferences. The following cycles have been observed: x re-
ceived at time r is preferred to y received at time s which is preferred to z received
at time t which is preferred to x received at time r (Roelofsma and Read, 2000).
1.2. Explaining the anomalies
We brie￿ y summarize here some attempts at explaining anomalies 1-6. These attempts
will be discussed in greater depth later in the paper.
1. Generalized hyperbolic discounting (LP). LP provided the ￿rst coherent explanation
of anomalies 1-4. They also provided an axiomatic derivation of their generalized
hyperbolic discount function, which we shall call the LP-discount function. LP ex-
plained the magnitude e⁄ect through a value function with increasing elasticity.
This makes higher magnitudes more salient. They explained gain-loss asymmetry
by adopting a value function with greater elasticity for losses than for gains, which
4However, Andersen et al (2007), by jointly eliciting attitudes to risk and time, estimate much lower
discount rates, of about 10.1%.
2makes losses more salient. The common di⁄erence e⁄ect is explained in LP by the
notion of declining impatience (roughly, one is more impatient as the date of the
reward approaches). Hence, despite identical intervals separating two time-outcome
pairs, the choice among the two depends on how close to the current period they
are. However, LP cannot explain anomalies 5 and 6.
2. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (PPL). Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997),
￿ PPL￿for short, provided the very tractable quasi-hyperbolic discount function. This
is also known in the literature as the ￿-￿ discount function but we shall call it the
PPL-discount function. It is, by far, the most popular discount function in appli-
cations (after, of course, exponential discounting). The explanation of the common
di⁄erence e⁄ect in PPL is by a sudden drop in impatience at time zero (followed by
constant impatience thereafter). Using the other LP assumptions, PPL can explain
anomalies 1, 2 and 4 in the same way. Like LP, PPL cannot explain anomalies 5 and
6.
3. Subadditivity and intransitivity (RRS). Roelofsma and Read (2000) provided exper-
imental evidence for non-transitivity of time preferences. The experimental work
of Read (2001) con￿rmed the common di⁄erence e⁄ect but rejected declining im-
patience in favour of constant impatience and, hence, rejected the LP (and PPL)
explanation of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect in terms of declining impatience. Read
(2001) and Scholten and Read (2006a) found experimental evidence for subadditivity
and introduced the concept of an interval discount function5. Furthermore, based on
empirical evidence, Scholten and Read (2006a) developed a speci￿c interval discount
function, which we shall call the RS-discount function. The RS-discount function
(depending on parameter values) can explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect as due to
either declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of both. We shall refer
to this work collectively as ￿ RRS￿ .
4. Attribute based models. Another possibility is to suppose that the time-outcome pairs
which are to be compared consist of two natural attributes: time of delivery and
monetary value. One can then consider the tradeo⁄ between the two attributes in
determining which time-money pair will be chosen.
4.1 Rubinstein (2003) advocated the use of a similarity relationship. If a larger
reward is available earlier, then this is always preferred to a smaller reward
available later. However, if the choice is between a smaller-earlier pair and a
5An interval discount function, D(r;t), 0 ￿ r ￿ t, discounts a quantity from time t back to time r. If
D is additive (and only if D is additive), then D(r;t) = D(r;s)D(s;t), for all s, r ￿ s ￿ t.
3larger-later pair, then there is a con￿ ict between the attribute of money and
that of time. In this case, choice is lexicographic. If either the time or the money
dimension is ￿ similar￿then it is ignored and the two pairs are then compared
across the remaining dimension and a sensible choice made (e.g. more money
or earlier time). Failing this, if there is no similarity in either dimension, then
no decision can be made. Thus the preference relationship in Rubinstein (2003)
is incomplete.
4.2 Manzini and Mariotti (2006), in their ￿ theory of vague time preferences￿ , develop
an attribute model that can explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. Manzini and
Mariotti propose three criteria to choose between a smaller amount of money
delivered sooner (SS) and a larger amount of money delivered later (LL). The
primary criterion is to choose whichever has the highest present utility value. If
the two present values are not ￿ signi￿cantly￿di⁄erent, then the subject chooses
the one with the highest monetary value (secondary criteria). If they have the
same monetary values, so that the secondary criterion fails, then the subject
behaves according to the third criterion: ￿ choose the outcome that is delivered
sooner￿ . If all three criteria fail, then the subject is indi⁄erent. Thus, Manzini
and Mariotti achieve a complete, though intransitive, ordering. In particular,
indi⁄erence here is not an equivalence relationship. On the other hand, the
experimental results of Roelofsma and Read (2000) supported ￿ sooner is better
than larger￿against ￿ larger is better than sooner￿ . However, if the order of the
secondary criteria is reversed, so that sooner is better than larger (in agreement
with the experimental results of Roelofsma and Reed, 2000), then we would
not get a common di⁄erence e⁄ect. However, whether Manzini and Mariotti￿ s
explanation of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is acceptable or not, to us the main
contribution of their paper lies in the use of primary and secondary criteria.
This appears to us to be a more accurate description of actual decision making
then the assumption of a single criterion (see subsection 5.3, below).
4.3 Scholten and Read (2006b) present a critique of the psychological basis for
discounting models (including their own). They develop an attribute model
based on ￿rmer psychological foundations. In subsection 5.1, we argue that their
tradeo⁄model is equivalent to a discounted utility model that is a generalization
of their model (Scholten and Read, 2006a). If this is accepted, then their
tradeo⁄ model lends further support to their own discount function, the RS-
discount function.
5. Uncertainty and exponential discounting. Under uncertainty the common di⁄erence
e⁄ect never arises when we use expected utility with exponential discounting. Hence,
4it is quite possible that the experimental ￿nding of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is
a rejection of expected utility rather than exponential discounting. Halevy (2007)
shows that when non-expected utility is combined with exponential discounting,
the theory is consistent with the presence of a common di⁄erence e⁄ect, provided
uncertainty is present but su¢ ciently small (see subsection 5.2, below).
6. Intransitivity and relative discounting. Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) assume neither
transitivity nor additivity. In its present formulation, it cannot account for either
gain-loss asymmetry or delay-speedup asymmetry. But a more serious problem is the
lack of transitivity. Thus it appears that it will be hard to work with this theory,
as the authors themselves explain. On the other hand, these problems can all be
resolved in the special case of a transitive preference relation. But then their model
becomes additive. In this case, Ok and Masatlioglu would reduce to a standard
discounting model (see subsection 5.4, below).
1.3. Towards a general theory of intertemporal choice: The reference-time the-
ory (RT)
Within the class of time preference models which are separable in time and outcomes
(also known as delay-discounting models), what should a general theory of time preference
aspire to? We suggest two desirable elements. First, it should be able to explain anomalies
1-6. Second, it should provide a framework that can incorporate recent developments in
time discounting such as uncertainty (Halevy, 2007) and attribute models (Manzini and
Mariotti, 2006 and Scholten and Read, 2006b).
The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of intertemporal choice that incorporates
the two desirable elements mentioned above. We call this theory the reference-time theory
of intertemporal choice, ￿ RT￿for short. It is a synthesis of three earlier seminal works,
namely, LP, PPL and RRS. In a nutshell, RT is basically LP extended to allow for non-
additive time discounting by incorporating a reference point for time.6 We explain the
anomalies 1-6 as follows.
1. Like LP, we explain the magnitude e⁄ect (anomaly 2) by assuming that the elasticity
of the value function is increasing. However, in section 3, we show that several
popular classes of utility functions violate this condition. These includes CARA
(constant absolute risk aversion), CRRA (constant relative risk aversion), HARA
(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion), logarithmic and quadratic. We develop a scheme
for generating value functions that exhibit increasing elasticity, as required to explain
6The ￿rst version of this paper was written entirely within the LP framework. We are grateful to
a referee for suggesting we attempt to extend it to include more recent development, in particular non-
additivity and intransitivity.
5the magnitude e⁄ect. The simplest class that has this property we call the class
of simple increasing elasticity value functions (SIE). Each member of this class is
formed by a product of a HARA function and a CRRA function and, therefore, is
quite tractable. We provide a class of utility functions compatible with any theory
where preferences are separable in time and outcomes. This includes RT theory, as
well as LP, PPL, RRS, Halevy (2007) and Manzini and Mariotti (2006) (sections 3,
4 and 5, below).
2. LP explained the gain-loss asymmetry (anomaly 1) by assuming that the elasticity
of the value function for losses exceeds the elasticity for gains. This allows them
to use the same discount function for gains and losses, in agreement with the strict
separability of time and outcomes. The downside of their approach is that the
coe¢ cient of loss aversion is then variable, which contradicts the empirical evidence.
In Example 4, section 4, below, we explore the implications of having the same
discount function for gains and losses, as in LP. We show that, as time goes to
in￿nity, the coe¢ cient of loss aversion also goes to in￿nity. This is in contrast
to the empirical ￿ndings of a constant coe¢ cient of loss aversion, approximately
equal to 2.25 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992). For this reason, we assume
a constant coe¢ cient of loss aversion. This, in turn, forces us to adopt di⁄erent
discount functions for gains and losses to explain anomaly 1.7
3. LP provided an axiomatic derivation of their generalized hyperbolic discount function
(which we call the LP-discount function). For this, they added the extra assumption
of linear delay to that of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. While there is considerable
empirical evidence for the common di⁄erence e⁄ect, the assumption of linear delay is
added purely for convenience. We extend the LP derivation as follows. At the most
general level, which requires neither linear delay nor the common di⁄erence e⁄ect,
we have our Representation Theorem 2 (Proposition 12, below). We introduce a
weaker notion of subadditivity, which we call ￿-subadditivity (De￿nition 12, below).
According to our Characterization Theorem 4 (Proposition 21, below), preferences
exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect if, and only if, ￿-subadditivity holds. We also
introduce a generalization of the concept of linear delay of LP. We call this ￿-delay.
Our Proposition 23, below, then shows that ￿-delay implies the common di⁄erence
e⁄ect. Imposing additivity, as well as ￿-delay, gives our Proposition 24, below. The
special case of the latter with ￿ = 1 gives the LP-discount function. Our more
general approach also allows us to derive the RS-discount function (Proposition 25,
below). In particular, as with RRS, we can explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect
7We are grateful for the comments of a critical referee, which helped us clarify these issues.
6(anomaly 3) as due to either declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of
both. However, our approach is more general, as RT can also explain the common
di⁄erence e⁄ect as due to the presence of a small amount of irremovable uncertainty,
as in Halevy (2007), or as a consequence of multiple decision criteria, as in Manzini
and Mariotti (2006) (see section 5, below). Thus, RT can accommodate all the
known explanations of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. In the spirit of RRS, we leave
it to empirical evidence to select the correct explanation.
4. We show the delay-speedup asymmetry (anomaly 4) follows from our other assump-
tions (see Proposition 30, below).
5. We follow LP in adopting prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992) as our underlying decision theory. But, in addition to a
reference point for wealth, we introduce a reference point for time. If preferences are
additive and if the discount function for gains is the same as that for losses, as in LP,
then the choice of the reference point for time is immaterial (Proposition 7, below).
However, if preferences are non-additive, then the choice of the reference point for
time matters. Thus, we can accommodate non-additive preferences (anomaly 5) by
having a reference point for time. A consequence is that all our discount functions
are interval discount functions, as in RRS.
6. Given a reference point for wealth, w0, and a reference point for time, r, our prefer-
ences are complete and transitive (subsection 2.3, below). Thus they may be called
conditionally complete and conditionally transitive (conditional on w0 and r). We
explain observed intransitivity as due to a change in the reference point for time (see
subsections 2.4 and 2.8, below). This is in contrast to Ok and Masatlioglu (subsec-
tion 5.4, below), where preferences are complete but intransitive (in our terminology
we may describe such preferences as unconditionally complete but not even condi-
tionally transitive). Thus the relative-discounting theory Ok and Masatlioglu and
the reference-time theory of this paper are not compatible and neither is a special
case of the other.
To summarize, the theory presented in this paper (reference-time theory or RT) can
explain anomalies 1-6 (section, 4, below) and can be extended to incorporate uncertainty,
as in Halevy (2007), and the attribute models of Manzini and Mariotti (2006) and Scholten
and Read (2006b) (section 5, below).
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
72. A reference-time theory of intertemporal choice (RT)
This section is structured as follows. We ￿rst discuss the anomalies of intertemporal choice
(subsections 2.1). Next we outline prospect theory (subsection 2.2), which is an essential
building block of RT. We de￿ne preferences for RT as early as possible (subsection 2.3).
This is followed by further essential material on discount functions, additivity, impatience,
intransitivity and the common di⁄erence e⁄ect (subsections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9).
The main technical machinery: representation, extension and characterization theorems
are developed in subsections 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12). Finally, in subsection 2.13 we are in
a position to extend LP to allow for non-additive time discounting by incorporating a
reference point for time (and also separate discount functions for gains and losses).
2.1. Anomalies of intertemporal choice: Refutations of the exponentially dis-
counted utility model or of neoclassical economics more generally?
To ￿x ideas, we start with a simple neoclassical example.
Example 1 (A neoclassical example): Consider a single consumer who lives for two pe-
riods. He has exogenous incomes I1 and I2 in periods 1 and 2, respectively. He faces the
exogenous ￿xed real interest rate, r, per period, compound continuously. Let c1 and c2
be real consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Then the consumer￿ s intertemporal
budget constraint is
c1 + e
￿rc2 = I1 + e
￿rI2. (2.1)
Let the consumer￿ s utility function be
U (c1;c2). (2.2)
The consumer￿ s problem is then to maximize U (c1;c2) subject to the budget constraint
(2.1) and non-negativity constrains:
c1 ￿ 0, c2 ￿ 0. (2.3)
Note well: the income stream (I1;I2) is relevant to the decision problem only through
its present value, I1+e￿rI2, discounted by the real interest rate available to the consumer,
r. In particular, if a subject is o⁄ered a choice between real monetary rewards, x in period
1 and y in period 2, then the subject should choose x over y if, and only if, x > e￿ry (and
choose y over x if, and only if, x < e￿ry). So, if a subject exhibits behavior inconsistent
with this rule, that behavior would constitute a refutation of neoclassical economics, and
not just a speci￿c functional form for U (as no such assumption has been made above).
For example, if subjects exhibit a clear preference for increasing income streams over
8constant or declining income streams, all with the same present value, that behavior would
constitute a refutation of neoclassical economics, and not just the exponentially discounted
form. The same can be said about the anomalies reported in subsection 1.1, above. Each
one of them is a refutation of neoclassical economics, not just the exponentially discounted
utility model as is usually, but mistakenly, claimed.
Therefore, each attempt at explaining anomalies of intertemporal choice (as far as we
know) involves some element of behavioral economics. The mental accounting literature
(Thaler, 1999) argues that separate income streams might not fully be integrated. LP (and
this paper) use prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992) as the underlying decision theory. Scholten and Read (2006b) and Manzini
and Mariotti (2006) use attribute models, Halevy (2007) uses non-linear transformation
of probabilities and Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) assume non-transitive preferences.
For further discussion of these issues, see Manzini and Mariotti (2008) and Frederick et
al. (2002), sections 3.1 ￿Integration of new alternatives with existing plans￿ , 5.3.3 ￿Mental-
accounting models￿ , 5.3.4 ￿Choice bracketing￿and 6.1.2 ￿Intertemporal arbitrage￿ .
2.2. Prospect theory
We follow LP in using prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) rather than standard utility theory. Prospect theory distinguishes be-
tween two phases of decision making: editing and evaluation.
In the editing phase, a decision maker simpli￿es a real world problem to make it
amenable to formal analysis and reduce the associated cognitive load. As part of the
editing phase a reference point is chosen to which outcomes are to be compared.
In the evaluation phase, a value (a real number) is attached to each feasible action by
the decision maker. The action with highest value is chosen. The function, v, that assigns
values to actions in prospect theory is called the value function, it is the analogue of the
indirect utility function of standard utility theory. In standard utility theory carriers of
utility are the outcomes of actions. But in prospect theory carriers of utility are deviations
in outcomes from the reference point. In general, the action chosen in the evaluation phase
will depend on the reference point chosen in the editing phase.
The value function, v, in prospect theory has four main properties: reference depen-
dence, monotonicity, declining sensitivity, loss aversion. Furthermore, in prospect theory,
there is non-linear transformation of probabilities. There is good empirical support for
these feature; see, for instance, Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
We take v to be the value function introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Thus
9v satis￿es:
v : (￿1;1) ! (￿1;1) is continuous, strictly increasing (monotonicity). (2.4)
v (0) = 0 (reference dependence) and is twice di⁄erentiable except at 0. (2.5)
For x > 0: ￿ v (￿x) > v (x) (loss aversion). (2.6)
Following LP, we de￿ne the elasticity of the value function as follows.






, x 6= 0. (2.7)
2.3. Preferences
We consider a decision maker who, at time t0, takes an action that results in the level of
wealth wi at time ti, i = 1;2;:::;n, where
t0 ￿ r ￿ t1 < ::: < tn. (2.8)
Time r is the reference time: the time back to which all values are to be discounted. We
can choose any moment of time as time zero and measure all other times relative to it. We
choose to set t0 = 0, i.e., the time a decision is made is always time t = 0. If it is desired
to set t0 6= 0, then simply replace all times, t, below, with t ￿ t0. The decision maker￿ s
intertemporal utility function is given by:
Vr ((x1;t1);(x2;t2);:::;(xn;tn)) = ￿
n
i=1v (xi)D￿ (r;ti), (2.9)
where v is the value function introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). xi = wi ￿w0
is the di⁄erence between the wealth level, wi, at time, ti, and the reference level for wealth,
w0. D￿ (r;ti) is the discount function, it discounts v (xi) from time, ti, back to the reference
time, r. D￿ (r;ti) = D+ (r;ti) if xi ￿ 0 and D￿ (r;ti) = D￿ (r;ti) if xi < 0.
More formally, we assume that, for each (w0;r) 2 (￿1;1) ￿ [0;1), the decision
maker has a complete transitive preference relation, ￿w0;r on (￿1;1)￿[r;1). We think
of w0 as the reference point for wealth and r the reference point for time. If (w;t) 2
(￿1;1) ￿ [r;1), with w ￿ w0, we say that (w;t) is an outcome in the domain of gains.
If (w;t) 2 (￿1;1)￿[r;1), with w ￿ w0, we say that (w;t) is an outcome in the domain
of losses. We assume that ￿w0;r is represented by a utility function v (w ￿ w0)D￿ (r;t).
Thus (w1;t1) ￿w0;r (w2;t2) if, and only if, v (w1 ￿ w0)D￿ (r;t1) ￿ v (w2 ￿ w0)D￿ (r;t2).
10Using (2.9), we extend ￿w0;r to a complete transitive preference relation on sequences
from (￿1;1) ￿ [r;1), as follows8:
((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿w0;r ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn))
, Vr ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿ Vr ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)) (2.10)
We depart from LP in the following ways. LP have a reference point for wealth but not
for time. We have a reference point for wealth, w0, and a reference point for time, r. LP
assume the same discount function for gains and losses. We allow the discount function for
gains to be di⁄erent from that for losses. LP implicitly assume that the discount function
is additive (De￿nition 5, below). We allow the discount function to be non-additive, to
accommodate the empirical evidence of RRS. If the discount function is additive and is
the same for gains and losses (as in LP), then the choice of the reference point for time is
irrelevant, since (x;s) ￿w0;r (y;t) if, and only if, (x;s) ￿w0;0 (y;t) (Proposition 7, below).
However, if the discount function is non-additive, then the choice of the reference point
for time matters. We use this to explain (apparent) intransitivity as a framing e⁄ect due
to a change in the reference point for time.
2.4. Determination of the reference point for time
Let S be a non-empty set of sequences from (￿1;1)￿[0;1). Suppose a decision maker
is interested in comparing the members of S. For example, for the purpose of choosing
the optimal member (if S is compact). For this he needs a reference point for time. Let T
be the set of times involved, i.e.,
T = ft 2 [0;1) : t = ti for some sequence f(x1;t1);(x2;t2);:::;(xi;ti);:::g in Sg.
(2.11)
Since T is bounded below (by 0) and non-empty, it follows that T has a greatest lower
bound, r. We make the following tentative assumption:
A0 Reference time. Given S, T, r, as described just above, we assume that the decision
maker takes r as the reference point for time.
For example, if a decision maker wants to compare x received at time s with y received
at time t, s ￿ t, then S consists of just two sequences, each with just one element:
S = f(x;s);(y;t)g and T = fs;tg. Thus A0 implies that r = s. If v (x) < v (y)D(s;t)
then the decision maker chooses (y;t) over (x;s).
A0 does not have the status of the LP assumptions A1-A4, introduced in subsection
2.13, below. While there is considerable, though debated, empirical evidence for A1-A4,
A0 should be regarded as a tentative assumption, whose implications are to be explored.
8This also holds for in￿nite sequences, provided the sum in (2.9) is convergent.
11We will only use A0 in subsections 2.8 and 2.13. In subsection 2.8, we use A0 to explain
(apparent) intransitivity as due to a shift in the reference point for time. In subsection
2.13, we use A0 to prove that assumption A4 (Delay-speedup asymmetry) follows from
the other assumptions (Proposition 30).
2.5. Discount functions
The ￿ve discount functions that will be important for this paper are:
Exponential: D(r;t) = e





1 when r = t = 0
e￿(￿+￿t) when r = 0;t > 0












, t ￿ 0, r ￿ 0, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0. (2.14)






￿ , 0 ￿ r ￿ t, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0. (2.15)
generalized RS: D(r;t) = e
￿Q[w(t)￿w(r)], 0 ￿ r ￿ t,
Q : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing,
w : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing. (2.16)
The exponential discount function (2.12) was introduced by Samuelson (1937). Aside
from its tractability, the main attraction of EDU is that it leads to time-consistent choices.
If the plan (x1;t1);(x2;t2);:::;(xn;tn) is optimal at time 0, then at time tk the plan
(xk+1;tk+1);(xk+2;tk+2);:::;(xn;tn) is also optimal. But this may no longer be true for
more general speci￿cations of the discount function.
The ￿￿ (or quasi-hyperbolic) discount function (2.13) was proposed by Phelps and
Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997). Its popularity in applied work is second only to EDU.9
The generalized hyperbolic discount function (2.14) was proposed by Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992). For the special case, ￿ = ￿, (2.14) it reduces to the hyperbolic discount
function. These three discount functions are additive (De￿nition 3, below). They can
account for the common di⁄erence e⁄ect through declining impatience (De￿nition 6, below)
but they cannot account for either non-additivity or intransitivity.
The interval discount function (2.15) was introduced by Scholten and Read (2006a).
It can account for both non-additivity and intransitivity. It can account for the com-
mon di⁄erence e⁄ect though declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of both
(subsections 2.8 and 2.9, below).
9It can be given the following psychological foundation. The decision maker essentially uses exponential
discounting. But in the short run is overcome by visceral in￿uences such as temptation or procrastination.
12In subsection 5.1, below, we shall show that the attribute model of Scholten and Read
(2006b) is equivalent to a discounted utility model with the discount function (2.16), which
is a generalization of their RS-discount function (2.15).
Note that (2.14) approaches (2.12) as ￿ ! 0. In general, neither of (2.14) or (2.15) is a
special case of the other. However, for r = 0 (and only for r = 0), (2.15) reduces to (2.14)
when ￿ = ￿ = 1. Scholten and Read (2006a) report incorrectly that the LP-discount
function is a special case of the RS-discount function. One needs to restrict r = 0 (in
addition to ￿ = ￿ = 1) in order to generate the LP from the RS-discount function. While
￿;￿ are parameters, r is a variable. Hence, neither discount function is a special case of
the other.
We now give a formal de￿nition of a discount function. This will be the ￿rst (and,
of course, the most important) of ￿ve functions we will introduce (the others are: the
generating function, the delay function, the seed function and the extension function).
De￿nition 2 (Discount functions): Let
￿ = f(r;t) 2 R ￿ R : 0 ￿ r ￿ tg. (2.17)
A discount function is a mapping, D : ￿ ! (0;1], satisfying:
(i) For each r 2 [0;1), D(r;t) is a strictly decreasing function of t 2 [r;1) into (0;1]
with D(r;r) = 1.
(ii) For each t 2 [0;1), D(r;t) is a strictly increasing function of r 2 [0;t] into (0;1].
Furthermore, if D satis￿es (i) with ￿ into￿replaced with ￿ onto￿ , then we call D a continuous
discount function.
Our terminology suggests that a continuous discount function is continuous. That this
is partly true, is established by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 : A continuous discount function, D(r;t), is continuous in t.
Proposition 2 : Each of (2.12), (2.14) and (2.15) is a continuous discount function in the
sense of De￿nition 2. However, (2.13) is a discount function but not a continuous discount
function.
The reason that (2.13) fails to be a continuous discount function is that lim
t!0+D(0;t) =
e￿￿ < 1 = D(0;0).
From (2.14) and (2.15) we see that the restrictions r ￿ 0 and t ￿ 0 are needed. From
(2.15) we see that the further restriction r ￿ t is needed.10 From (2.12) we see that the
￿ into￿in De￿nition 2(ii) cannot be strengthened to ￿ onto￿ .
10One alternative is to de￿ne D(t;s) to be 1=D(s;t). But we do not know if people, when compounding
forward, use the inverse of discount function (as they should, from a normative point of view). Fortunately,
we have no need to resolve these issues in this paper.
13Proposition 3 (Time sensitivity): Let D be a continuous discount function. Suppose
r ￿ 0. If 0 < x ￿ y, or if y ￿ x < 0, then v (x) = v (y)D(r;t) for some t 2 [r;1).11
Proposition 4 (Existence of present values): Let D be a discount function. Let r ￿ t.
Let y ￿ 0 (y ￿ 0). Then, for some x, 0 ￿ x ￿ y (y ￿ x ￿ 0), v (x) = v (y)D(r;t).12
2.6. Additivity
We now de￿ne additivity and related concepts.
De￿nition 3 (Additivity): A discount function, D(r;t), is
additive if D(r;s)D(s;t) = D(r;t), for r ￿ s ￿ t, (2.18)
subadditive if D(r;s)D(s;t) < D(r;t), for r < s < t, (2.19)
superadditive if D(r;s)D(s;t) > D(r;t), for r < s < t. (2.20)
Additivity (2.18) implies that discounting a quantity from time t back to time s and
then further back to time r is the same as discounting that quantity from time t back to
time r in one step.
To aid further development, we de￿ne a generating function, whose interpretation will
become apparent from Proposition 5 that follows the de￿nition.
De￿nition 4 (The generating function): Let ’ : [0;1) ! (0;1] be a strictly decreasing
function with ’(0) = 1. Then we call ’ a generating function. If, in addition, ’ is onto,
we call ’ a continuous generating function.
A ￿ continuous generating function￿is continuous. The proof is the same as that of
Proposition 1 and, therefore, will be omitted.
Proposition 5 (Additive extension theorem):
(a) Let D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) for some strictly decreasing real valued function, ’ :
[0;1) ! (0;1]. Then the following hold:
(i) D is an additive discount function.
(ii) If ’(0) = 1 (so that ’ is a generating function), then D(0;t) = ’(t).
(iii) If ’ is onto (so that ’ is a continuous generating function), then D is an additive
continuous discount function and D(0;t) = ’(t).
(b) Let D be an additive discount function. Then the following hold:
11We have chosen the phrase ￿ time sensitivity￿to conform with the terminology of OM, Axiom A1, p219,
and Claim 3, p235.
12We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that Proposition 4 follows from (2.4), (2.5) and De￿nition
2; and for suggesting the name ￿ existence of a present value￿ .
14(i) D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) for some strictly decreasing real valued function, ’ : [0;1) !
(0;1] with ’(0) = 1 (hence, ’ is a generating function).
(ii) If D is a continuous discount function, then ’ is onto (hence, ’ is a continuous gener-
ating function).
(iii) D(0;t) = ’(t).
Proposition 5 justi￿es the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 5 (Additive extensions): Let ’ be a generating function. Let D(r;t) =
[’(r)]
￿1 ’(t). Then:
(i) We call ’ the generating function of the additive discount function, D.
(ii) We call D the additive extension of ’.
(iii) We also refer to D(r;t) as the additive extension of D(0;t).
Proposition 6 : The discount functions (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) are additive. In each
case, D(r;t) is the additive extension of D(0;t) and ’(t) = D(0;t) is the generating
function for D(r;t). However, (2.15) is not additive. (2.16) is additive if, and only if,
Q[w(t) ￿ w(r)] = Q[w(t)] ￿ Q[w(r)], in which case D(r;t) = eQ[w(r)]￿Q[w(t)] is the addi-
tive extension of D(0;t) = e￿Q[w(t)] and e￿Q[w(t)] is the generating function.
Proposition 7 (Invariance to the choice of reference time): Assume that one of the fol-
lowing holds.
(i) D+ (r;t) = D￿ (r;t) = D(r;t) and D(r;t) is additive.
(ii) D+ (r;t) is additive and all outcomes are in the domain of gains
(iii) D￿ (r;t) is additive and all outcomes are in the domain of losses.
Then
((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿w0;r ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn))
, ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿w0;0 ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)).
Thus, if we have the same additive discount function for gains and losses (as is the case
with LP) then the choice of the reference time, r, back to which all utilities are discounted,
is irrelevant. Discounting back to time r is equivalent to discounting back to time 0. Hence,
the same result holds, even if we have di⁄erent additive discount functions for gains and
losses, provided all outcomes are in the domain of gains or all outcomes are in the domain
of losses. However, if our discount function is not additive, or if the discount function for
gains is di⁄erent from the discount function for losses and we have a mixture of gains and
losses, then the optimal choice of the decision maker may depend on the reference point
for time.
152.7. Impatience
The following concepts are also useful.
De￿nition 6 (Impatience): A discount function, D(r;s), exhibits13
declining impatience if D(r;s) < D(r + t;s + t), for t > 0 and r < s, (2.21)
constant impatience if D(r;s) = D(r + t;s + t), for t ￿ 0 and r ￿ s, (2.22)
increasing impatience if D(r;s) > D(r + t;s + t), for t > 0 and r < s. (2.23)
Proposition 8 : Let D(r;t) be the RS-discount function (2.15), then:
(a) If 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, then D is subadditive.
(b) If ￿ > 1, then D is neither subadditive, additive nor superadditive.
(c) (i) If 0 < ￿ < 1, then D exhibits declining impatience.
(ii) If ￿ = 1, then D exhibits constant impatience.
(iii) If ￿ > 1, then D exhibits increasing impatience.
Scholten and Read (2006a), bottom of p1425, state: ￿ > 0 implies subadditivity
(incorrect), ￿ > 1 implies superadditivity (incorrect) and 0 < ￿ < 1 implies declining
impatience (correct but incomplete). Proposition 8 clari￿es these points.
In the light of Proposition 8, we can now see the interpretation of the parameters ￿
and ￿ in the RS-discount function (2.15). ￿ controls impatience, independently of the
values of the other parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿: 0 < ￿ < 1, gives declining impatience, ￿ = 1
gives constant impatience and ￿ > 1gives increasing impatience. If 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, then we
get subadditivity, irrespective of the values of the other parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿. However,
if ￿ > 1, then (2.15) can be neither subadditive, additive nor superadditive (depending
on the particular values of r, s and t, we may have D(r;s) < D(r + t;s + t), D(r;s) =
D(r + t;s + t) or D(r;s) > D(r + t;s + t)).
2.8. Intransitive preferences: Real or apparent?
Consider the following hypothetical situation. A decision maker prefers a payo⁄of 1 now to
a payo⁄of 2 next period, i.e., (2, next period) ￿ (1, now). The decision maker also prefers
a payo⁄of 2 next period to a payo⁄of 3 two periods fromnow, i.e., (3, 2 two periods from now)
￿ (2, next period). Finally, the same decision maker prefers a payo⁄of 3 two periods from
now to a payo⁄ of 1 now, i.e., (1, now) ￿ (3, 2 two periods from now). Schematically:
(1, now) ￿ (3, 2 two periods from now) ￿ (2, next period) ￿ (1, now). (2.24)
13Some authors use ￿ present bias￿for what we call ￿ declining impatience￿ . But other authors use ￿ present
bias￿to mean that the discount function, D(s;t) is declining in t. So we prefer ￿ declining impatience￿to
avoid confusion. It is common to use ￿ stationarity￿for what we call ￿ constant impatience￿ . We prefer the
latter, to be in conformity with ￿ declining impatience￿and ￿ increasing impatience￿ .
16Ok and Masatlioglu (2007, p215) use a similar example to motivate their intransitive theory
of relative discounting.
Alternatively, we may view (2.24) as due to a framing e⁄ect resulting in a shift in
the reference point for time. Assume that the choice of reference time in each pairwise
comparison is the sooner of the two dates, in conformity with Assumption A0, subsection
2.4. Then (2.24) can be formalized as follows.
V0 (1;0) < V0 (3;2), V1 (3;2) < V1 (2;1), V0 (2;1) < V0 (1;0). (2.25)
Thus, the decision maker prefers a payo⁄ of 1 now to a payo⁄ of 2 next period, both
discounted back to the present. The decision maker also prefers a payo⁄of 2 next period to
a payo⁄of 3 the following period, both discounted back to next period. Finally, the decision
maker prefers a payo⁄ of 3 in two periods from now to a payo⁄ of 1 now, both discounted
back to the present. If this view is accepted, then the apparent intransitivity in (2.24) arises
from con￿ ating V0 (3;2) with V1 (3;2) and V1 (2;1) with V0 (2;1). The following example
shows that (2.25) is consistent with a reference-time theory of intertemporal choice.
Example 2 : Take the reference point for wealth be the current level of wealth, so each
payo⁄ is regarded as a gain to current wealth. Take the value function to be14
v (x) = x
1
2 (1 + x)
1
2 , x ￿ 0. (2.26)
Thus (working to ￿ve signi￿cant ￿gures),
v (1) = 1:4142, v (2) = 2:4495 and v (3) = 3:4641. (2.27)
As our discount function we take the Read-Scholten discount function (2.15) with ￿ =



















, D(1;2) = 0:60842 and D(0;2) = 0:45679. (2.29)
From (2.27) and (2.29) we get
V0 (1;0) = v (1)D(0;0) = 1:4142, (2.30)
V0 (3;2) = v (3)D(0;2) = 1:5824, (2.31)
V1 (3;2) = v (3)D(1;2) = 2:1076, (2.32)
14The reasons for this choice will become clear in sections 3.1 and 3.2, below. Many other choices are
possible.
17V1 (2;1) = v (2)D(1;1) = 2:4495, (2.33)
V0 (2;1) = v (2)D(0;1) = 1:2248. (2.34)
From (2.30) to (2.34), we get
V0 (1;0) < V0 (3;2), V1 (3;2) < V1 (2;1), V0 (2;1) < V0 (1;0), (2.35)
con￿rming (2.25).
A consequence of Proposition 7 is that no additive discount function (e.g., exponential
(2.12), PPL (2.13) or LP (2.14)) can explain (apparently) intransitive choices as exhibited
in (2.24). The reason is that, under the conditions of that proposition, all utilities can be
discounted back to time zero and, hence, can be compared and ordered.
2.9. The common di⁄erence e⁄ect: Declining impatience or subadditivity?
Let us reconsider the common di⁄erence e⁄ect, using Thaler￿ s apples example (anomaly
3 in the list of subsection 1.1). A decision maker prefers one apple today to two apples
tomorrow, so that
v (1) > v (2)D(0;1). (2.36)
However, the decision maker, today, prefers to receive two apples in 51 days￿time to
receiving one apple in 50 days￿time, so that
v (1)D(0;50) < v (2)D(0;51). (2.37)
From (2.36) and (2.37) we get
D(0;50)D(0;1) < D(0;51). (2.38)
If we assume additivity (as did LP), so that D(0;51) = D(0;50)D(50;51), we get, from
(2.38), D(0;1) < D(50;51). So the decision maker exhibits declining impatience. How-
ever, and as Read (2001) pointed out, subadditivity could be an alternative explanation.
To see this, assume constant impatience, so that D(0;1) = D(50;51). Then (2.38) gives
D(0;50)D(50;51) < D(0;51). Thus, the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is consistent with con-
stant impatience if the discount function is su¢ ciently subadditive.
Example 3 : (Thaler￿ s apples example)
Take the reference point to be ￿ no apples￿and take the value function to be15
v (x) = x
1
2 (1 + x)
1
2 , x ￿ 0. (2.39)
15The reasons for this choice will become clear in sections 3.1 and 3.2, below. Many other choices will
also do.
18Thus (working to ￿ve signi￿cant ￿gures),
v (1) = 1:4142 and v (2) = 2:4495. (2.40)
We compare the resolution of the ￿ common di⁄erence e⁄ect￿ anomaly under the LP-
discount function (2.14) and the RS-discount function (2.15). To simplify as much as
possible, choose the parameters: ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 1. We shall use these parameters in
other examples too. We tabulate the relevant magnitudes below:
LP: D(s;t) = (1 + s)(1 + t)







Recall that the decision maker prefers one apple today to two apples tomorrow if, and only
if,
v (1) > v (2)D(0;1). (2.41)
On the other hand, the decision maker, today, prefers to receive two apples in 51 days￿
time to receiving one apple in 50 days￿time if, and only if,
v (1)D(0;50) < v (2)D(0;51). (2.42)
Substituting from the above table and (2.40) into (2.41) and (2.42) gives, respectively,16
v (1) = 1:4 > 1:2 = v (2)D(0;1), (2.43)
v (1)D(0;50) = 0:028 < 2:4 = v (2)D(0;51), (2.44)
for both the LP-discount function and the RS-discount function. This illustrates that
both approaches can explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. However, they explain in very
di⁄erent ways. Comparing rows one and four of the table, we see that the LP-discount
function exhibits declining impatience, D(0;1) = 1
2 < 51
52 = D(50;51), while the RS-
discount function exhibits constant impatience, D(0;1) = 1
2 = D(50;51). On the other
hand, comparing rows three and ￿ve of the table, we see that the LP-discount function is
additive, D(0;51) = 1
52 = D(0;50)D(50;51), while the RS-discount function subadditive,
D(0;51) = 1
52 > 1
102 = D(0;50)D(50;51). Thus, the LP-discount function explains the
common di⁄erence e⁄ect as exclusively due to declining impatience, while the RS-discount
function explains this e⁄ect as due (in this example, exclusively) to subadditivity. More
16In the presentation of the results, we write down the ￿rst two signi￿cant ￿gures, which is entirely
adequate.
19generally, and provided 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, the RS-discount function can combine subadditiv-
ity with declining impatience (0 < ￿ < 1), constant impatience (￿ = 1) or increasing
impatience (￿ > 1).
Of course, and as Read (2001) pointed out, the common di⁄erence e⁄ect could be due
to both declining impatience and subadditivity. Read (2001), conducted a series of exper-
iments that tested for the common di⁄erence e⁄ect and could also discriminate between
subadditivity and declining impatience. He found support for the common di⁄erence e⁄ect
and for subadditivity but rejected declining impatience in favour of constant impatience.
Read (2001) also discusses the psychological foundation for subadditivity.
2.10. Representation theorems
Suppose that x received at time 0 is equivalent to y received at time t (when both are
discounted back to time 0), so that v (x) = v (y)D(0;t). Suppose that the receipt of x
is delayed to time s. We ask, at what time, T, will y received at time T be equivalent
to x received at time s (when both are discounted back to time 0)? Or, for what time,
T, will the following hold: v (x)D(0;s) = v (y)D(0;T)? For the exponential discount
function (2.12) the answer is clear: T = s + t. More generally, does such a T exist? Is it
unique? Does it depend on x;y as well as s;t? What are its properties? These questions
are answered by Propositions 9 and 10, below. But ￿rst, a de￿nition.
De￿nition 7 (Delay functions): Let D be a discount function. Suppose the function, ￿,
has the property D(0;s)D(0;t) = D(0;￿(s;t)), s ￿ 0, t ￿ 0. Then we call ￿ a delay
function corresponding to the discount function, D. We also say that the discount function,
D, exhibits ￿-delay.
Proposition 9 (Properties of a delay function): Let D be a discount function and ￿ a
corresponding delay function. Then ￿ has the following properties:
(a) ￿ is unique,
(b) ￿(s;t) is strictly increasing in each of s and t,
(c) ￿(s;t) = ￿(t;s),
(d) ￿(0;t) = ￿(t;0) = t,
(e) v (x) = v (y)D(0;t) if, and only if, v (x)D(0;s) = v (y)D(0;￿(s;t)).
Suppose that x received at time 0 is equivalent to y received at time t (when both
are discounted back to time 0), so that v (x) = v (y)D(0;t). Suppose that the receipt of
x is delayed to time s. Then, according to Proposition 9(e), the delay function, ￿(s;t),
if it exists, gives the time to which the receipt of y has to be deferred, so as to retain
equivalence to x (when both are discounted back to time 0). Therefore, we called ￿ a
delay function.
20Proposition 10 (Existence of a delay function): A continuous discount function has a
unique delay function.
We now introduce our fourth de￿ned function (the others were: the discount function,
the generating function and the delay function).
De￿nition 8 (The seed function): Let   : [0;1) ! [0;1) be strictly increasing, with
  (0) = 0. We call   a seed function. If, in addition,   is onto, we call   a continuous seed
function.
A ￿ continuous seed function￿is continuous. The proof is similar to that of Proposition
1 and, therefore, will be omitted.
The following de￿nition gives a useful representation for discount functions.




an (￿;￿)-representation of the discount function D(r;t).
Proposition 11, below, establishes the existence of (￿;￿)-representations for continuous
discount functions and shows their connection to delay functions.
Proposition 11 (Representation Theorem 1): Let D be a continuous discount function.
Let ￿ be the corresponding delay function. Then, for each ￿ > 0 and each ￿ > 0, D has
the unique (￿;￿)-representation D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿. Moreover,   has the properties:
(a)   : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing (hence   (0) = 0 and   is a continuous seed
function).
(b)  
￿1 exists and  
￿1 : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing with  
￿1 (0) = 0.
(c) ￿(s;t) =  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)].
From Proposition 11, we see that if ￿ is to be the delay function of some continuous dis-
count function, then it must take the form given in part (c) of that proposition. In the light
of this, when considering possible delay functions, we can restrict ourselves, without loss of
generality, to the class of functions of the form ￿(s;t) =  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)],
where   is as in part (a), i.e., a continuous seed function.
The following proposition is a generalization of LP￿ s derivation of their generalized
hyperbolic discount function.
Proposition 12 (Representation Theorem 2): Let   : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) be strictly in-
creasing, ￿ > 0 and ￿(s;t) =  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)]. Let D be a continuous




21According to Propositions 9(a) and 10, a continuous discount function determines a
unique delay function. Hence, we can partition the set of all continuous discount functions
into equivalence classes, two continuous discount functions being in the same equivalence
class if, and only if, they have the same delay function. Many di⁄erent discount functions
could have the same delay function. In fact, according to Representation Theorem 1
(Proposition 11), all (the di⁄erent) continuous discount functions, D, for which D(0;t) =
[1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿ (￿xed ￿ and  , di⁄erent ￿￿ s) have the same delay function and, hence, lie
in the same equivalence class. But does an equivalence class contain other continuous
discount functions? Representation Theorem 2 (Proposition 12) gives the answer ￿ no￿ :
Consider an arbitrary equivalence class. Choose some member of that class. Let it have
the (￿;￿)-representation D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿. Then all members of its class can be
obtained by varying ￿, keeping ￿ and   ￿xed.
2.11. Extension theorems
Proposition 8(a) and (b) established that the RS-discount function (2.15) is not additive
and, hence, cannot be obtained as an additive extension of a strictly decreasing function
’ : [0;1) ! (0;1], ’(0) = 1. We, therefore, need a more general way to extend such
a strictly decreasing function to a discount function. This is what we turn to in this
subsection. We start by introducing our ￿fth, and ￿nal, de￿ned function.
De￿nition 10 (extension functions): Let f : ￿ ! [0;1) satisfy:
(i) For each r 2 [0;1), f (r;t) is a strictly increasing function of t 2 [r;1) into [0;1),
with f (r;r) = 0.
(ii) For each t 2 [0;1), f (r;t) is a strictly decreasing function of r 2 [0;t] into [0;t], with
f (0;t) = t.
Then we call f an extension function. If, in (i), ￿ into￿is replaced with ￿ onto￿ , then we call
f a continuous extension function.
A ￿ continuous extension function￿ , f (r;t), is continuous in t. The proof is the same as
that of Proposition 1 and, therefore, will be omitted.
De￿nition 11 (f-extensions): Let D be a discount function. Let f : ￿ ! [0;1) satisfy
D(r;t) = D(0;f (r;t)), then
(a) we call f an extension function corresponding to D,
(b) we refer to D(r;t) as an f-extension of D(0;t), or just an f-extension.
De￿nition 10 de￿nes extension functions independently of any discount function. By
contrast, De￿nition 11 de￿nes an extension function corresponding to a give discount
function. Our terminology suggests that ￿ an extension function corresponding to a given
22discount function￿is, in fact, ￿ an extension function￿ . That this is indeed the case, is
established in the following proposition.
Proposition 13 (Extension Theorem 1): Let D be a discount function. Let f be a
corresponding extension function in the sense of De￿nition 11(a). Then:
(a) f is unique.
(b) f is an extension function in the sense of De￿nition 10.
(c) v (x) = v (y)D(r;t) if, and only if, v (x) = v (y)D(0;f (r;t)).
Suppose that x received at time r is equivalent to y received at time t, 0 ￿ r ￿ t,
time r being the reference time; so that v (x) = v (y)D(r;t). Suppose that the receipt of
x is brought forward to time 0. We ask, at what time, T, will y received at time T be
equivalent to x received at time 0, time 0 being the new reference time? Or, for what time,
T, will the following hold: v (x) = v (y)D(0;T)? For the exponential discount function
(2.12) the answer is clear: T = t ￿ r. More generally, Proposition 13(c) gives the answer
as T = f (r;t).
Proposition 14 (Extension Theorem 2): Let the discount function, D, be continuous.
Then there exists an extension function, f, corresponding to D in the sense of De￿nition
11. Moreover, f is unique and is a continuous extension function in the sense of De￿nition
10.
Proposition 15 (Extension Theorem 3): Let ’ be a generating function and f an exten-
sion function. Then:
(a) D(r;t) = ’(f (r;t)) is a discount function.
(b) f is the extension function corresponding to D and D(r;t) is the f-extension of D(0;t).
(c) If ’ is a continuous generating function and f a continuous extension function, then
D is a continuous discount function.
To summarize, given a generating function, ’, and an extension function, f, by Exten-
sion Theorem 3 (Proposition 15), we can construct a discount function D so that D(r;t)
is the f-extension of ’(t) = D(0;t). Extension Theorem 2 (Proposition 14) tells us that
all continuous discount functions are obtainable in this way from continuous generating
functions and continuous extension functions.
2.12. Characterization theorems
We can combine the representation and extension theorems of the previous two subsections
to produce further useful results, which we now turn to.
23Proposition 16 (Characterization Theorem 1): D is a continuous discount function if,
and only if, D(r;t) = [1 + ￿  (f (r;t))]
￿
￿
￿, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, where   is a continuous seed
function and f is a continuous extension function. Furthermore, f is uniquely determined
by D.
Proposition 17 (Characterization Theorem 2): A continuous discount function with the
extension function, f, exhibits:
(a) declining impatience if, and only if, f (r;s) > f (r + t;s + t), for t > 0 and r < s,
(b) constant impatience if, and only if, f (r;s) = f (r + t;s + t), for t ￿ 0 and r ￿ s,
(c) increasing impatience if, and only if, f (r;s) < f (r + t;s + t), for t > 0 and r < s,
Proposition 18 (Characterization Theorem 3): A continuous discount function, D, is














Proposition 19 : The following two tables give a seed function,  , the generating func-
tion, ’, the extension function, f, and the delay function, ￿, of each of the discount
functions D(r;t) (2.12) to (2.15).
  (t) ’(t) f (r;t) ￿(s;t)
exponential e￿t￿1
￿ e￿￿t t ￿ r s + t




1+￿r s + t + ￿st
RS t￿￿ [1 + ￿t￿￿]
￿
￿
￿ (t￿ ￿ r￿)
1








￿ e￿Q[w(t)] w￿1 [w(t) ￿ w(r)] w￿1Q￿1 [Q(w(s)) + Q(w(t))]
PPL (r = t = 0) 0 1 0 s




￿ e￿(￿+￿t) t ￿
￿ + s + t
PPL (0 < r ￿ t) e￿t￿1
















PPL (r = t = 0) 1
PPL (0 = r < t) e￿(￿+￿t)
PPL (0 < r ￿ t) e￿￿(t￿r)
Starting with a continuous seed function,  , an ￿ > 0 and a ￿ > 0, we can ￿ grow￿from
them a unique generating function, ’(t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿ (which turns out to be contin-
uous). Given this generating function and a continuous extension function, f (r;t), we




turns out to be continuous). This discount function determines a unique delay function,
￿(s;t) =  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)].
24Conversely, a continuous discount function, D, determines a unique (continuous) gen-
erating function, ’(t) = D(0;t) and a unique (continuous) extension function, f, so that
D is the f-extension of ’: D(r;t) = ’(f (r;t)).
Although a continuous discount function, D, determines unique generating, exten-
sion and delay functions, ’, f and ￿, it does not determine unique ￿, ￿ or   in the
representation D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿. For example, the LP-discount function D(r;t) =
(1 + ￿r)
￿
￿ (1 + ￿t)
￿
￿




(with   (t) = t) and, hence, the delay function ￿(s;t) = s + t + ￿st. But it also has
many other representations: D(0;t) = [1 + a  (t)]
￿ b




a , for all a > 0
and all b > 0. However, it can easily be check that [1 + a  (t)]
￿ b





￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + a  (s)  (t)] = s + t + ￿st. Since the delay function, ￿, but not the
seed function,  , is uniquely determined by D, it is better to say that D exhibits ￿ delay
rather than   delay.
2.13. Assumptions and consequences
LP introduce four assumptions, all with good experimental support (LP, II pp574-578).
We adapt these assumption to allow for (i) discount functions that are not, necessarily,
additive and (ii) discount functions that may be di⁄erent for gains and losses. Under these
latter two conditions, the reference point for time becomes important (Proposition 7). Let
the discount functions for gains, D+, and for losses, D￿, be given by:
D+ (r;t) =
￿
1 + ￿+ + (f+ (r;t))
￿￿
￿+
￿+ ;￿+ > 0;￿+ > 0, (2.45)
D￿ (r;t) =
￿
1 + ￿￿ ￿ (f￿ (r;t))
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿ ;￿￿ > 0;￿￿ > 0, (2.46)
where  + and f+ are, respectively, the seed and extension functions for gains. Analo-
gously,  ￿ and f￿ are, respectively, the seed and extension functions for losses. If D+ is a
continuous discount function then it can always be represented in the form (2.45), where
 + is a continuous seed function and f+ is a continuous extension function. Moreover, f+
is determined uniquely by D+ (Characterization Theorem 1 (Proposition 16)). Analogous
statements hold for the discount function for losses, D￿. Furthermore, under the assump-
tion of continuity, D+ and D￿ will have unique delay functions, ￿+ and ￿￿, respectively
(Propositions 9 and 10 and Representation Theorem 1 (Proposition 11)), and are given
by:




 + (s) +  + (t) + ￿+ + (s) + (t)
￿
, (2.47)




 ￿ (s) +  ￿ (t) + ￿￿ ￿ (s) ￿ (t)
￿
. (2.48)
Assumptions A1 to A4, below, correspond to anomalies 1 to 4, above (subsection 1.1).
25Thus, what is regarded as anomalous behavior from the neoclassical point of view is at
the core of the RT theory.
Given discount functions, D￿ (r;t), for gains (+) and losses (￿) respectively, the as-
sumption A1 to A4, below, place restrictions only on D￿ (0;t), i.e., only on discounting
from an arbitrary time, t ￿ 0, back to time zero. Hence, to derive results for D￿ (r;t),
further assumptions are needed. In particular, for Proposition 24 we assume that D￿ (r;t)
is an additive extension of D￿ (0;t), while for Proposition 25 we assume that D￿ (r;t) is
an f-extension of D￿ (0;t) for f￿ (r;t) = (t￿￿ ￿ r￿￿)
1
￿￿.
A1 Gain-loss asymmetry. If 0 < x < y and v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t), then v (￿x) >
v (￿y)D￿ (0;t).
A2 Magnitude e⁄ect. If 0 < x < y, v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t) and a > 1, then v (ax) <
v (ay)D+ (0;t). If y < x < 0, v (x) = v (y)D￿ (0;t) and a > 1, then v (ax) >
v (ay)D￿ (0;t).
A3 Common di⁄erence e⁄ect. If 0 < x < y, v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t) and s > 0, then
v (x)D+ (0;s) < v (y)D+ (0;s + t). If y < x < 0, v (x) = v (y)D￿ (0;t) and s > 0,
then v (x)D￿ (0;s) > v (y)D￿ (0;s + t).
A4 Delay-speedup asymmetry. For c > 0, s > 0 and t > 0, V0 ((0;0);(c;s);(￿c;s + t)) <
￿V0 ((0;0);(￿c;s);(c;s + t)).17
De￿nition 12 (￿-subadditivity): Let ￿ > 0. A function,  , is ￿-subadditive if, for all s
and t for which   is de￿ned and non-zero:   (s + t) <   (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t).
A function,  , is subadditive (in the standard sense) if, for all s and t for which   is
de￿ned:   (s + t) ￿   (s) +   (t). A function that is ￿-subadditive, for some ￿ > 0, need
not be subadditive. However, a function is subadditive if, and only if, it is ￿-subadditive
for all ￿ > 0.18
17A4 is to be understood as follows. In the LHS of the inequality, the reference stream of the decision
maker is 0;0;c (for dates 0;s;s+t) i.e. a reward is contractually promised at time s+t > 0: The individual
is then o⁄ered a choice to receive the reward early, at time s (speedup). Given the assumption on reference
time, in A0, the income stream, relative to reference wealth, 0;c;￿c, can be explained as follows: The
individual was not expecting anything at times 0 and s so relative to reference wealth, he gets 0￿0;c￿0
at times 0 and s: Having received a reward of c at time s; his reference wealth is c: Hence, at time t + s
his wealth relative to the reference wealth is 0 ￿ c = ￿c: For the RHS of the inequality, the contractually
promised income stream is 0;c;0 (for dates 0;s;s + t): The individual is then told that the reward will
now instead be available only at time s + t (delay). Proceeding as before, the stream of income relative
to the reference point is now 0;￿c;c.
18Similarly, a function,  , is additive (in the standard sense) if, for all s and t for which   is de￿ned:
  (s + t) =   (s) +   (t). Consider the exponential discount function, D(r;t) = e￿￿(t￿r), ￿ > 0. Then
lnD(0;t) is additive in this sense. And, of course, D(r;t) is additive in the sense of De￿nition 3. Also
note that ￿-subaddivity, as in De￿nition 12, neither implies nor is implied by subadditivity of the discount
function, as in De￿nition 3.
26Proposition 20 (Representation Theorem 3): Let D be a continuous discount function.
Let ￿ be the corresponding delay function. Let ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. Let D(0;t) =
[1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿ be an (￿;￿)-representation of D. Then the following are equivalent:
(a)   is ￿-subadditive.
(b) If s > 0 and t > 0, then ￿(s;t) > s + t.
(c) If s > 0 and t > 0, then D(0;s)D(0;t) < D(0;s + t).
Proposition 21 (Characterization Theorem 4): Let D be a continuous discount function.
Then preferences exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect for gains if, and only if, the seed
function for gains,  +, is ￿+-subadditive.19 Similarly, preferences exhibit the common
di⁄erence e⁄ect for losses if, and only if, the seed function for losses,  ￿, is ￿￿-subadditive.
De￿nition 13 (￿-delay): Preferences exhibit ￿-delay, if the delay functions for gains
(2.47) and losses (2.48) are:






￿+ , ￿+ > 0, 0 < ￿+ ￿ 1, (2.49)






￿￿ , ￿￿ > 0, 0 < ￿￿ ￿ 1. (2.50)
In particular, if ￿+ = ￿￿ = 1, we say that preferences exhibit linear delay.
A delay function, if it exists, is unique (Proposition 9) and it always exists for a
continuous discount function (Proposition 10). Hence, De￿nition 13 is a sound de￿nition.
However, it should be remembered that ￿-delay is a property of the delay function, ￿, not
of the seed function,   (see discussion at end of subsection 2.12).
Proposition 22 : If preferences exhibit ￿-delay, then they also exhibit the common dif-
ference e⁄ect.
Proposition 23 : If preferences, with continuous discount functions for gains and losses,




and D￿ (0;t) = (1 + ￿￿t￿￿)
￿
￿￿
￿￿, where ￿+, ￿￿, ￿+, ￿￿ are all positive.
Proposition 24 (generalization of LP): If preferences, with additive continuous discount













￿￿, where ￿+, ￿￿, ￿+, ￿￿ are all
positive.
In particular, ￿+ = ￿￿, ￿+ = ￿￿ and ￿+ = ￿￿ = 1 give the LP-discount function (2.14).
19We noted earlier that the common di⁄erence e⁄ect can be explained by a combination of declining
impatience and subadditivity of the discount function. However, ￿+-subadditivity is not to be confused
with subadditivity of the discount function.





￿￿. Let f+ (r;t) = (t￿+ ￿ r￿+)
1
￿+ and f￿ (r;t) = (t￿￿ ￿ r￿￿)
1
￿￿. Let preferences
with continuous discount function D+ (gains) and D￿ (losses) exhibit ￿-delay. Let the
extension function of D+ be f+ and that of D￿ be f￿. Then D+ and D￿ are the RS-
discount functions:










where ￿+, ￿￿, ￿+, ￿￿ are all positive.20
Proposition 26 (LP): Suppose that the continuous discount function, D￿, satis￿es D￿ =
D+. Then A1 implies the following:





(b) The value function is more elastic for losses than for gains: x > 0 ) ￿v (￿x) > ￿v (x).
Proposition 27 (LP): For a continuous discount function, A2 implies that the value
function is




v(ay), for a > 1,
(b) more elastic for outcomes of larger absolute magnitude: (0 < x < y or y < x < 0) )
￿v (x) < ￿v (y).21
Intuitively, increasing elasticity of the value function implies greater sensitivity of v
to increases in x. This in turn increases the weight of larger outcomes (D￿ (r;t)v(xt)) in
intertemporal plans. A similar intuition applies to the result in Proposition 26(b).
We now add two standard assumption from prospect theory. The ￿rst is that the value
function is strictly concave for gains and strictly convex for losses (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979):
A5 Declining sensitivity. For x > 0, v00 (x) < 0 (strict concavity for gains). For x < 0,
v00 (x) > 0 (strict convexity for losses).
Combining A5 with Proposition 27 we get:
Proposition 28 : A2 and A5 imply that 0 < ￿v < 1.
20Strictly speaking, what we call as the RS-discount function is a slight generalization of the discount
function in Scholten and Read (2006a). They do not have a reference point for time/wealth, nor do they
have separate discounting for gains and losses.
21This proposition is stated incorrectly in al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006a).
28The second assumption that we add from prospect theory is constant loss aversion.
While this is not core to prospect theory, it is very useful and has good empirical support
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991 and 1992):
A6 Constant loss aversion. v (￿x) = ￿￿v (x), ￿ > 1, for x > 0,
With the aid of these two extra assumptions, we get the following two theorems:
Proposition 29 : From A1 and A6 it follows that, for a continuous discount function:
(a) t > 0 ) D+ (0;t) < D￿ (0;t),





(c) x > 0 ) ￿v (￿x) = ￿v (x).
Proposition 30 : Assumption A4 (delay-speedup asymmetry) follows from the other
assumptions, in particular A0 (reference time), A1 (gain-loss asymmetry) and A6 (constant
loss aversion).
As mentioned above, LP assume that D+ = D￿. While this is consistent with their
theory, it does not follow from it. Assuming that D+ = D￿ is obviously attractive.
However, it implies (Proposition 26) that gain-loss asymmetry (A1) can only be satis￿ed
if ￿v (￿x) > ￿v (x), for x > 0. In the light of Proposition 29, this would exclude value
functions exhibiting constant loss aversion. While constant loss aversion is not core to
prospect theory, this auxiliary assumption considerably simpli￿es application of the theory
and is consistent with the evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992).
Propositions 26 and 27 are due to LP. Proposition 24 extends LP from linear delay to
￿-delay.
3. Simple increasing elasticity value functions (SIE)
A natural question that arises is ￿ Is the RT theory developed in section 2 consistent?￿ A
related question is ￿ Is there a tractable functional form for the value function which can be
combined with RT theory to produce a useful model?￿We address these questions in this
section. In subsection 3.2, below, we answer the second question in the a¢ rmative. We
call the value function developed there a simple increasing elasticity (SIE) value function.
Our a¢ rmative answer to the second question also provides an a¢ rmative answer to the
￿rst question. But ￿rst, in subsection 3.1, immediately below, we show that none of several
popular families of functions is compatible with RT theory or, indeed, any theory (e.g.,
LP) that attempts to explain the magnitude e⁄ect on the basis of increasing elasticity of
the value function.
293.1. Incompatibility of HARA value functions with the reference-time theory
We consider several popular classes of value functions including CARA (constant absolute
risk aversion), CRRA (constant relative risk aversion), HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion), logarithmic and quadratic. Proposition 31, below, shows that each member
of this family exhibits constant or declining elasticity, contradicting LP￿ s Proposition 27,
which holds in the RT theory. Hence, none of these families is compatible with the RT
theory (and, hence, none is compatible with the LP theory either). First, we give the
de￿nitions and main properties of this family of functions, followed by the main result of
this subsection: Proposition 31.
Notation: We use the notation, ￿A and ￿R respectively, for the coe¢ cients of absolute
risk aversion and relative risk aversion. So for a utility function v (x); ￿A = ￿
v00(x)
v0(x)
and ￿R = ￿
xv00(x)
v0(x) :




, 0 < ￿ < 1,
v
0 (x) = x
￿￿ > 0; v









= 1 ￿ ￿. (3.1)
The general restriction is that ￿ 6= 1. However, we need the stronger restriction, 0 < ￿ < 1,
in order to satisfy Proposition 28. It is clear, from the last line of (3.1), that members of
the CRRA class of functions violate Proposition 27 and, hence, are not compatible with
RT theory.












, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, 0 < ￿ < 1, x ￿ 0,
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> 0 implies that ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. We then also need ￿ < 1
in order to satisfy Corollary 28.













￿￿1, which is increasing in x, as required by Proposition 27.
While an additive constant, of course, makes no di⁄erence in expected utility theory; its
absence here would violate the assumption v (0) = 0. However, including the constant
￿
￿
1￿￿￿1￿￿, to make v (0) = 0, results in ￿v (x) decreasing with x, as will be shown by
Proposition 31, and, hence, violates Proposition 27.
The following three classes of functions are also regarded members of the HARA family.
3.1.3. Constant absolute risk aversion functions (CARA)
v (x) = 1 ￿ e
￿￿x, ￿ > 0, x ￿ 0,
v
0 (x) = ￿e
￿￿x > 0; v




















From the last line of (3.3), we see that ￿v (x) is decreasing with x. Hence, the CARA class
is not compatible with the RT theory.
3.1.4. Logarithmic functions
v (x) = ln(1 + ￿x), ￿ > 0, x ￿ 0,
v
0 (x) = ￿(1 + ￿x)
￿1 > 0; v
00 (x) = ￿￿







(1 + ￿x)ln(1 + ￿x)
. (3.4)
Proposition 31, below, establishes that ￿v (x) is decreasing with x. Hence this class is not















0 (x) = ￿(￿ ￿ ￿x)
2 > 0; v
00 (x) = ￿2￿







￿2 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿x)
2. (3.5)
31Proposition 31, below, establishes that ￿v (x) is decreasing with x. Hence this class is also
not compatible with the RT theory.
Proposition 31 : For members of the CRRA class of value functions (3.1), ￿v (x) is
constant. For members of the HARA (3.2), CARA (3.3), logarithmic (3.4) and quadratic
(3.5) classes of functions, ￿v (x) is declining. Hence none of these families is compatible
with the RT theory.
3.2. A value function compatible with the reference-time theory
We do two things in this subsection. First, we provide a simple tractable functional form for
the value function that is compatible with the RT theory. We call this a simple increasing
elasticity (SIE) value function. Second, we provide a scheme for generating further such
functions. This is important for two reasons. First, it provides a model for the RT theory
and, therefore, establishes its internal consistency. Second, these functional forms may aid
applications and further theoretical development.
The following method can be used to generate candidates for value functions compatible
with the RT theory. Choose a function, h(x), satisfying:
0 < h(x) < 1, h
0 (x) > 0, (3.6)











+ c, x ￿ 0,
a > 0, b > 0, c > 0, a + c ￿ 1. (3.8)





















lnv = aln(b + x) + clnx + lnK,
v (x) = K (b + x)
a x
c. (3.9)
32Choosing a = 1 ￿ ￿, b =
￿￿

















, x ￿ 0, (3.10)
The restrictions a > 0, b > 0, c > 0, a + c ￿ 1 give: 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1 and ￿=￿ > 0. To
ensure that v0 > 0, take ￿ > 0. Hence ￿ > 0. For x < 0, de￿ne v (x) by v (x) = ￿￿v (￿x),










, x ￿ 0,











, x < 0,
￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 1, 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1, (3.11)
where ￿ is the (constant) coe¢ cient of loss aversion.









Proposition 32 : From (3.11) it follows that:
(a) v : (￿1;1) ! (￿1;1), v (0) = 0, v is continuous, v is C1 except at x = 0.












> 0, x > 0,

















< 0, x >
0,
(d) v0 (x) = ￿v0 (￿x) > 0, x < 0,
(e) v00 (x) = ￿￿v00 (￿x) > 0, x < 0,
(f) ￿v (x) = x
v
dv






v (x) > 0, x > 0,
(g) ￿v (x) = x
v
dv






v (x) < 0, x < 0,

















> 0, x > 0,

















> 0, x > 0,







v0(￿x) < 0, x < 0,







v0(￿x) < 0, x < 0,
Corollary 1 : From (f) and (g) of Proposition 31, we get that ￿v (x) ! ￿ as x # 0 and





> 0, ￿v (x) is
increasing in jxj and ￿v (x) ! ￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, as jxj ! 1.
33Remark 1 (SIE value function): In the light of Corollary 1, we may call the value function
(3.11) a simple increasing elasticity (SIE) value function.
4. Explaining the anomalies
Here, we put together the results of sections 2 and 3. In (4.1), (4.3) and (4.4), below,
we reproduce the discount functions (2.12), (2.14) and (2.15) but with the parameter
restrictions implied by the propositions of section 2. For completeness, we also reproduce
the PPL-discount function (2.13), with the relevant parameter restrictions, as (4.2).
exponential: D￿ (r;t) = e
￿￿￿(t￿r), 0 < ￿￿ < ￿+, (4.1)
PPL : D￿ (0;0) = 1,
D￿ (0;t) = e
￿(￿￿+￿￿t), t > 0,
D￿ (r;t) = e
￿￿￿(t￿r), 0 < r ￿ t,
where 0 < ￿￿ ￿ ￿+, 0 < ￿￿ ￿ ￿+
and either ￿￿ < ￿+ or ￿￿ < ￿+. (4.2)




























￿￿ , r ￿ t,






, 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, ￿ > 0, ￿￿ ￿ 1,







generalized RS: D￿ (r;t) = e
￿Q￿[w￿(t)￿w￿(r)], 0 ￿ r ￿ t,
Q￿ : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing,
w￿ : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing,
w+ (t) ￿ w￿ (t), Q+ (w+ (t)) ￿ Q￿ (w￿ (t)),
and either w+ (t) > w￿ (t) or Q+ (w+ (t)) > Q￿ (w￿ (t)). (4.5)
34The reasons for the parameter restrictions in (4.1) to (4.4) are as follows:
Exponential (4.1): ￿￿ > 0 ensures that D￿ (s;t) is strictly increasing in s and strictly
decreasing in t. ￿￿ < ￿+ ensures that D+ (0;t) < D￿ (0;t) for t > 0, as required by
Proposition 29.
PPL (4.2): 0 < ￿￿ ￿ ￿+, 0 < ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ensures that D￿ (s;t) is strictly increasing in s
and strictly decreasing in t. They also ensure that A1, gain-loss asymmetry, is satis￿ed.
If either ￿￿ < ￿+ or ￿￿ < ￿+, then A3, the common di⁄erence e⁄ect, is also satis￿ed.
LP (4.3): ￿￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0 ensure that D￿ (r;t) is strictly increasing in r and strictly




￿+ (at least one of them being strict) ensure that
D+ (0;t) < D￿ (0;t) for t > 0, as required by Proposition 29.
RS (4.4): ￿￿ > 0, ￿￿ > 0, ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 ensure that D￿ (r;t) is strictly increasing




￿+ (at least one of them being strict),
￿+ = ￿￿ = ￿ and ￿+ = ￿￿ = ￿ ensure that D+ (0;t) < D￿ (0;t) for t > 0, as required
by Proposition 29. ￿ ￿ 1 ensures subadditivity (Proposition 8 (a) and (b)). ￿￿ ￿ 1 is
required to ensure that ￿-delay is satis￿ed (with ￿ = ￿￿) and, hence, A3.22
Generalized RS (4.5): The restrictions guarantee that (4.5) is a continuous discount
function in the sense of De￿nition 2 and that D+ (0;t) < D￿ (0;t) in compliance with
Proposition 29.










, x ￿ 0,











, x < 0,
￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 1, 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1, (4.6)
Proposition 33 : Each of the four discount functions (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5), when
combined with the SIE value function (4.6), satis￿es assumptions A0 to A6, i.e., all the
assumptions.
4.1. A summing up
To sum up so far, exponential discounting (4.1) (even with di⁄erent discount rates for
gains and losses) cannot explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect (but see subsections 5.2 and
5.3, below). On the other hand, the PPL-discount function (4.2), the LP-discount function
(4.3) and the RS-discount function (4.4) can all explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. But
22To see why we need ￿+ = ￿￿, suppose 0 < ￿+ < ￿￿ < 1. If t > 1, then t￿+ < t￿￿. But if 0 < t < 1,
then t￿+ > t￿￿. For the same reason, we need ￿+ = ￿￿.
35they explain it in di⁄erent ways. The PPL (4.2) and LP (4.3) discount functions explain
the common di⁄erence e⁄ect with declining impatience. For PPL, there is a sudden drop
in impatience from time t = 0 to times t > 0, with impatience being constant for all
times t > 0. For LP, on the other hand, the decline in impatience is continuous (recall
Example 3). By contrast, the RS-discount function (4.4), on account of its subadditivity
(for 0 < ￿ ￿ 1) can explain the common di⁄erence whether we have declining impatience
(0 < ￿ < 1), constant impatience (￿ = 1) or increasing impatience (￿ > 1), provided
￿￿ ￿ 1 (recall Proposition 8 and Example 3).
On the other hand, none of the discount functions (4.1), (4.2) or (4.3) can explain
(apparent) intransitive preferences such as that exhibited by (2.24), recall Proposition 7
and subsection 2.8.
Thus, it emerges that of discount functions (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), the RS-discount
function (4.4) is the most satisfactory because, when combined with the SIE value function,
reference time/wealth, and di⁄erent discount functions for gains and losses, it can explain
all the anomalies: gain-loss asymmetry, the magnitude e⁄ect, the common di⁄erence e⁄ect,
delay-speedup asymmetry as well as subadditivity and (apparent) intransitivity.
Finally, we give an example that illustrates the di¢ culty inherent in taking the discount
function for gains to be same as that for losses.
Example 4 : (Identical discount functions for gains and losses): For our illustration, we
take ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 2, 0 < ￿ = ￿ = 1
2. These satisfy the restrictions on the value
function parameters in (3.11). Take ￿￿ = ￿+ = 1, ￿￿ = 1, ￿+ = 2, ￿ = ￿ = 1. These
satisfy the restrictions on the discount functions parameters in (4.3) and (4.4). With these
parameter values, the SIE value function (3.11) takes the form:
v (x) = x
1
2 (1 + x)
1
2 , x ￿ 0, (4.7)
v (x) = ￿2v (￿x) = ￿2(￿x)
1
2 (1 ￿ x)
1
2 , x < 0, (4.8)
The LP (4.3) and RS (4.4) discount functions take the forms:
LP : D+ (r;t) = (1 + r)
2 (1 + t)
￿2 , (4.9)
D￿ (r;t) = (1 + r)(1 + t)
￿1 , (4.10)
RS: D+ (r;t) = (1 + t ￿ r)
￿2 , r ￿ t, (4.11)
D￿ (r;t) = (1 + t ￿ r)
￿1 , r ￿ t. (4.12)
Note that for both the LP and RS-discount functions, we have:
LP & RS: D+ (0;t) = (1 + t)
￿2 , t ￿ 0, (4.13)
D￿ (0;t) = (1 + t)
￿1 , t ￿ 0, (4.14)
36Let V0 (x;t) be the value of x received at time t, discounted back to time 0. Then (2.9),
(4.7), (4.8), (4.13) and (4.14) give:
V0 (x;t) = x
1
2 (1 + x)
1
2 (1 + t)
￿2 , x ￿ 0, (4.15)
V0 (x;t) = ￿2(￿x)
1
2 (1 ￿ x)
1
2 (1 + t)
￿1 , x < 0. (4.16)
Rewrite (4.15) and (4.16) as:
V0 (x;t) = x
1
2 (1 + x)
1
2 (1 + t)
￿2 , x ￿ 0, (4.17)
V0 (x;t) = ￿2(1 + t)(￿x)
1
2 (1 ￿ x)
1
2 (1 + t)
￿2 , x < 0. (4.18)
Comparing (4.17) and (4.18), we see that gains and losses now have the same discount
function, D(0;t) = (1 + t)
￿2. But now the parameter of loss aversion, ￿(0;t) = 2(1 + t),
depends on the time, t, when x is received. In particular, ￿ ! 1 as t ! 1. We know of
no empirical evidence that supports this.
5. Alternatives and extensions
In this section, we compare the reference-time theory (RT) of section 2 with four recent
developments.
First, we consider the tradeo⁄ model of intertemporal choice of Scholten and Read
(2006b), SR for short. We will argue that SR￿ s tradeo⁄ criterion can be represented by a
discount function. Hence, it can be incorporated within RT. The gain is that their psycho-
logical arguments for their tradeo⁄ model give support for RT theory and, in particular,
their own RS-discount function.
The second development we consider is Halevy (2007), H for short, who shows that the
common di⁄erence e⁄ect is compatible with exponential discounting, provided subjects are
non-expected utility maximizers and exhibit the certainty e⁄ect. The certainty e⁄ect was
￿rst proposed as an explanation of the Allais paradox: subjects are much more sensitive
to a change from certainty to uncertainty than they are to changes in the middle range of
probabilities.
The third is the theory of vague time preferences of Manzini and Mariotti (2006),
MM for short. Again, they can explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect without departing
from exponential discounting. However, we believe that the importance of H and MM
far transcends their ability to explain the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. On the other hand,
and because in their present formulations they do not include any reference dependence,
they are unable to explain gain-loss asymmetry, delay-speedup asymmetry, subadditivity
and (apparent) intransitivity. By contrast, RT theory can explain all the anomalies. Nev-
ertheless, we believe that it is desirable, and easy, to extend RT theory to incorporate
37uncertainty, as in H, and multiple criteria, as in MM. We show this, below, in the context
of simple examples.
The fourth recent development we discuss here is the theory of intransitive preferences
and relative discounting of Ok and Masatlioglu (2007), OM for short. This is the most
radical of all the theories considered so far. From the outset it neither assumes transitivity
nor additivity and, hence, is compatible with these two phenomena. In its present for-
mulation, it cannot account for either gain-loss asymmetry or delay-speedup asymmetry.
Furthermore, the lack of transitivity will make it hard to work with this theory, as the
authors themselves explain. On the other hand, these problems can all be resolved in the
special case of a transitive preference relation. But then their model becomes additive. In
this case, OM would reduce to a standard discounting model.
Finally, all ￿ve theories (SR, H, MM, OM and RT) can explain the magnitude e⁄ect,
when combined with the SIE value function developed in this paper.
5.1. The tradeo⁄ model of intertemporal choice
Read and Scholten￿ s critique of discounting models, including their own, led them to
develop their tradeo⁄ model of intertemporal choice (Read and Scholten, 2006). It is
worth quoting their abstract in full:
￿Research on intertemporal judgement and choices between a smaller-sooner
and a larger-later outcome has revealed many anomalies to the discounted-
utility model. Attempts to account for these anomalies within the discounting
paradigm have resulted in convoluted and psychologically opaque models. We
therefore develop a new model of intertemporal choice, the tradeo⁄ model, in
which choice results from a tradeo⁄ between the perceived time di⁄erence (in-
terval) and the perceived outcome di⁄erence (compensation). This model is
both more parsimonious and more intuitive than any rival discounting model
of comparable scope. Moreover, it accurately describes archival data as well as
data from new experiments.￿
We argue that the tradeo⁄ model of Scholten and Read (2006b) can be incorporated
within RT-theory. If this is accepted, then their tradeo⁄ model lends further support to
the RT-theory and, in particular, their own discount function (2.15) and its generalization
(5.13), below.
We proceed by ￿rst recasting their model in a more general form (and indicate how
their model is to be obtained as a special case). However, there should be no presumption
that they would agree with our reformulation. They develop their model through three
successive versions. We concentrate on their fourth and ￿nal version, page 15.
38Let r ￿ 0 be the reference point for time.23 The tradeo⁄ model establishes preference
relationships, ￿r and ￿r between outcome pairs (x;s) and (y;t). Thus (x;s) ￿r (y;t) if,
and only if, y received at time t is strictly preferred to x received at time s. Similarly,
(x;s) ￿r (y;t) if, and only if, y received at time t is equivalent to x received at time s.
These relationship are established using three functions, a value function, u, a tradeo⁄
function Q and a delay-perception function, w. We make the following assumptions: Q :
[0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing, w : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing (the same
as in (5.13), below).24
First, let x > 0;y > 0 and s ￿ r ￿ 0;t ￿ r. Then:
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , Q[w(t) ￿ w(r)] ￿ Q[w(s) ￿ w(r)] = u(y) ￿ u(x), (5.1)
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , Q[w(t) ￿ w(r)] ￿ Q[w(s) ￿ w(r)] < u(y) ￿ u(x). (5.2)
Second, let x < 0;y < 0 and (as before) s ￿ r ￿ 0;t ￿ r. Then:
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , Q(w(t) ￿ w(r)) ￿ Q(w(s) ￿ w(r)) = u(x) ￿ u(y), (5.3)
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , Q(w(t) ￿ w(r)) ￿ Q(w(s) ￿ w(r)) > u(x) ￿ u(y). (5.4)
For completeness, we also need (again, s ￿ r ￿ 0;t ￿ r):
(0;s) ￿ r (0;t), (5.5)
x < 0 ) (x;s) ￿r (0;t), (5.6)
y > 0 ) (0;s) ￿r (y;t), (5.7)
x < 0;y > 0 ) (x;s) ￿r (y;t). (5.8)
To get the tradeo⁄ model of Read and Scholten, set r = s in the above equations.25
To de￿ne a discount function, D, that expresses these preferences, let
v (x) = e
u(x), for x > 0, (5.9)
v (x) = ￿e
￿u(x), for x < 0. (5.10)
Then all the above relations, (5.1) to (5.8), can be summarized by the following. For all
x;y and all r, s, t such that s ￿ r ￿ 0;t ￿ r:
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , v (x)e
￿Q[w(s)￿w(r)] = v (y)e
￿Q[w(t)￿w(r)], (5.11)
(x;s) ￿ r (y;t) , v (x)e
￿Q(w(s)￿w(r)) < v (y)e
￿Q[w(t)￿w(r)]. (5.12)
23To ease the burden of notation, we shall suppress reference to the reference point for wealth, w0.
Thus, in what follows, we write ￿r and ￿r when we should have written ￿r;w0 and ￿r;w0, respectively.
24They explicitly state two assumptions: Q0 > 0, Q00 < 0. However, in the next paragraph, they say
that Q00 > 0 for su¢ ciently small intervals. So, we make no assumptions on Q00. They explicitly state no
further assumptions on Q and w. However, we believe our other assumptions on Q and w are in line with
what they intend (see their equations (2) and (5) for the earlier, and simpler, versions of their model).
25They explicitly state only (5.1) and (5.3) (with r = s). However, we believe that our other equations
are in line with their framework.
39(5.11) and (5.12) suggest we take our discount function to be
generalized RS: D(r;t) = e
￿Q[w(t)￿w(r)], 0 ￿ r ￿ t,
Q : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing,
w : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing. (5.13)
which is a generalization of the discount function (2.15) of Scholten and Read (2006a).
Thus, RT-theory can incorporate the tradeo⁄ model.
5.2. The certainty e⁄ect
A test of a theory (T) is always a test of T plus auxiliary assumptions (O). Thus, a
refutation of T&O may be a refutation of O rather than T. However, since O is often
left implicit, a refutation of T&O may be misconstrued as a refutation of T rather than
O. A case in point may be T = ￿ exponential discounting￿and O = ￿ uncertainty is not
relevant￿ . In testing the common di⁄erence e⁄ect, not only is it better if subjects are paid
￿ real money￿ , the delays should be realistic too, i.e., quite long. Despite the experimenters￿
best e⁄orts to eliminate uncertainty, there will always be a residual risk that the subjects
will not receive their promised payo⁄s. If subjects were expected utility (EU) maximizers,
then risk would not matter (Example 5, below). However, if subjects overweight low
probabilities and underweight high probabilities (as in many non-EU theories), then risk
matters (Example 6, below). Moreover, the lower the residual risk the greater will be
its e⁄ect! (Example 7, below.)26 Thus, Halevy (2007) argues that the common di⁄erence
e⁄ect may, in fact, be a refutation of EU rather than exponential discounting.
The above points are illustrated by the following three examples. They all involve
a choice between receiving $1000 now or $1100 next year and, simultaneously, a choice
between receiving these two sums 10 and 11 years from now, respectively. We use the SIE
value function (4.6), so that
v (1000) = 1000:5 and v (1100) = 1100:5. (5.14)
Let the discount function be D(s;t) and the probability weighting function be w(p), where
p is the probability that the payo⁄ will actually be paid one year from now. We assume
independence across years so that the probability of receiving the payo⁄ t years from now
is pt. Let (x;t) be the event $x is received in year t and let (x;s) ￿ (y;t) mean (y;t) is
strictly preferred to (x;s). We take the current level of wealth, w0, and present time, r = 0,
to be the reference points for wealth and time, respectively (and, to simplify notation, we
26So, experimenters, by doing their best to reduce residual risk with the aim of getting a sharper
refutation of exponential discounting are, actually, achieving the opposite.
40have dropped the subscripts, w0;r, from ￿w0;r). We thus have:
No common di⁄erence e⁄ect: (1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) ) (1100;11) ￿ (1000;10) (5.15)
(1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) , v (1100)D(0;1)w(p) < v (1000), (5.16)









Example 5 (exponential discounting with expected utility): Assume exponential dis-
counting, so D(s;t) = e￿￿(t￿s), ￿ > 0, and expected utility, so w(p) = p. Substitute
in (5.16), (5.17) to get:
(1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) , v (1100)e
￿1p < v (1000), (5.18)
(1100;11) ￿ (1000;10) , v (1100)e
￿11￿p
11 < v (1000)e
￿10￿p
10, (5.19)
(5.19) is equivalent to:
(1100;11) ￿ (1000;10) , v (1100)e
￿1p < v (1000). (5.20)
From (5.18) and (5.20) we see that (1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) , (1100;11) ￿ (1000;10). Thus,
exponential discounting together with expected utility27 imply no common di⁄erence e⁄ect.
Hence, the observation of a common di⁄erence e⁄ect is a rejection of the joint hypothesis
of exponential discounting and expected utility. Thus, it would imply the rejection of one
or the other (or both) but not, necessarily, exponential discounting.
Example 6 (Exponential discounting with non-expected utility): We take cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as our model of non-expected utility.
Take D(r;t) = e￿￿(t￿r), ￿ = 0:04, and w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)￿
(the Prelec probability weighting
function)28 with ￿ = 0:5. Let p = 0:98. Substitute in (5.16), (5.17), using (5.14), to get:














A calculation shows that the inequality of the right hand side of (5.21) holds while
the corresponding inequality in (5.22) does not hold. Hence, (1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) but
(1100;11) ￿ (1000;10). Thus, exponential discounting may be consistent with an ob-
servation of a common di⁄erence e⁄ect, if subjects do not behave according to expected
utility.
27Or no risk so that p = 1 and, hence, w(p) = w(1) = 1.
28See Prelec (1998), Luce (2001) and al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006b).
41Example 7 (It￿ s the certainty e⁄ect that￿ s doing the work): The same as for Example
(6), except that now p = 0:4, rather than p = 0:98. Substitute in (5.16), (5.17), using
(5.14), to get:













A calculation shows that the inequality of the right hand side of (5.23) holds and also
the corresponding inequality in (5.24). Hence, (1100;1) ￿ (1000;0) and (1100;11) ￿
(1000;10). Thus, the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is due to the certainty e⁄ect in particular,
rather than uncertainty as such.
Example 7 suggests that if the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is due to the certainty e⁄ect
alone, rather than a combination of the certainty e⁄ect and non-exponential discounting,
then the phenomenon should disappear for probabilities around 0:4.
5.3. Vague time preferences
Manzini and Mariotti (2006) develop a theory of vague time preferences and discuss the
psychological foundations for such an approach. The intuition behind this theory is that
the choice between, say, receiving $1000 now and $1100 next year is clearer than the
choice between these two sums received 10 and 11 years from now, respectively. MM
propose three criteria to choose between (x;t) and (y;s). The primary criterion is to
choose whichever has the highest present utility value. If the two present values are not
￿ signi￿cantly￿di⁄erent, then the subject chooses the one with the highest monetary value
(secondary criteria). If they have the same monetary values, so that the secondary criterion
fails, then the subject behaves according to the third criterion: ￿ choose the outcome that
is delivered sooner￿ . If all three criteria fail, then the subject is indi⁄erent. Thus, MM
achieve a complete, though intransitive, ordering. In particular, indi⁄erence here is not
an equivalence relationship. Suppose that two present values are signi￿cantly di⁄erent if
their di⁄erence is greater than ￿, where ￿ is positive real number. Then we can state these
criteria formally as follows. (x;t) ￿w0;r (y;s) if, and only if, one of the following holds29:
1. v (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ v (x)D￿ (r;t) > ￿, or
2. jv (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ v (x)D￿ (r;t)j ￿ ￿, and x < y, or
3. jv (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ v (x)D￿ (r;t)j ￿ ￿, x = y and s < t.
29More generally, ￿ is a ￿ vagueness function￿ , in which case ￿ jv (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ v (x)D￿ (r;t)j ￿ ￿￿is
replaced by ￿ v (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ v (x)D￿ (r;t) ￿ ￿ (x;r;t) and v (x)D￿ (r;t) ￿ v (y)D￿ (r;s) ￿ ￿ (y;r;s)￿
42Obviously, if x and y are vectors, then extra criteria can be added. Present utility
values whose di⁄erence is less than ￿ are regarded as not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. This
could be because, for example, the decision maker is not sure of the appropriate value
function or discount function to use. Therefore, the decision maker does not want the
decision to depend too critically on the choice of these functions. On the other hand, the
decision maker might be absolutely sure that more is better than less and sooner is better
than later. Example 8, below, shows how this theory can explain the common di⁄erence
e⁄ect.
Example 8 : Consider the choice between receiving $1000 now and $1100 next year
and the choice between these two sums received 10 and 11 years from now, respectively.
As with the examples in subsection 5.2, we use the SIE value function (4.6), so that
5.14 holds. We use the exponential discount function (2.12) with ￿ = 0:1 and the ref-
erence time r = 0, D￿ (0;t) = e￿0:1t. We take ￿ = 3, so that present utility values
whose di⁄erence is less than 3 are regarded as not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. Using these
values, we get v (1000) ￿ v (1100)e￿0:1 = 1000:5 ￿ 1100:5e￿0:1 = 4:7264 > 3. Hence,
the primary criterion holds and the decision maker prefers $1000 now to $1100 next year.
Next, jv (1100)e￿1:1 ￿ v (1000)e￿1j = j1100:5e￿1:1 ￿ 1000:5e￿1j = 1:7388 < 3. Hence,
the primary criterion fails, and the decision maker considers the second criterion. Since
1000 < 1100, the second criterion holds. The decision maker prefers $1100 received 11
years from now to $1000 received 10 years from now. We have an illustration of the
common di⁄erence e⁄ect.
Recall, from subsection 2.8 above, that the experimental results of Roelofsma and
Read (2000) supported ￿ sooner is better than larger￿against ￿ larger is better than sooner￿ .
However, if the order of the secondary criteria is reversed, so that sooner is better than
larger (in agreement with the experimental results of Roelofsma and Reed, 2000), then
$1000 received 10 years from now would be better than $1100 received 11 years from now,
and we would not get a common di⁄erence e⁄ect.
However, whether MM￿ s explanation of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect is acceptable or
not, to us the main contribution of their paper lies in the use of primary and secondary
criteria. This appears to us to be a more accurate description of actual decision making
compared to the assumption of a single criterion.
5.4. Intransitive preferences and relative discounting
Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) (henceforth OM) accommodate (apparent) intransitivity, such
as (2.24), by regarding it as real. Thus, they develop a theory of intransitive time prefer-
ences. At time 0, a decision maker has a binary relationship, ￿, on the set ￿ = X￿[0;1),
43where X is a non-empty set. Let x;y 2 X and s;t 2 [0;1), then (x;s) ￿ (y;t) is to be
interpreted as ￿ y received at time t is (weakly) preferred to x received at time s￿ .
Let ￿ and ￿ be the symmetric and asymmetric parts of ￿, respectively. For each
t 2 [0;1), ￿t is the t-th time projection of ￿ onto X, i.e., x ￿t y, if, and only if,
(x;t) ￿ (y;t). In particular, ￿0 is the projection of ￿ onto X at time 0 (and, similarly,
for ￿t and ￿t).
If X is a metric space, then further structure can be imposed on ￿. In particular (OM,
p218):
De￿nition 14 (time preferences): Let X be a metric space, then ￿ is a time preference
on ￿ if
(i) ￿ is complete and continuous,
(ii) ￿0 is complete and transitive,
(iii) ￿t = ￿0 for each t 2 [0;1).
In De￿nition 14, note that transitivity is imposed on ￿0 (and, hence, also on ￿t) but
transitivity is not imposed on ￿. Hence, neither ￿ nor ￿ are, necessarily, transitive. In
particular, ￿ is not, in general, an equivalence relationship.
Let R be the set of real numbers, R+ the set of non-negative reals and R++ the set of
positive reals. Recall that a homeomorphism is a mapping that is 1-1, onto, continuous
and its inverse is also continuous. Then
Proposition 34 (OM, Theorem 1)30: Let X be an open interval in R and ￿ a binary
relation on ￿. ￿ is a time preference on ￿ that satis￿es properties (A1)-(A6) if, and
only, there exit an increasing homeomorphism U : X ! R++ and a continuous map
D : R2
+ ! R++ such that, for all x;y 2 X and s;t 2 [0;1),
(x;s) ￿ (y;t) i⁄ U (x) ￿ U (y)D(s;t), (5.25)
while (i) for given s, D(s;t) is decreasing in t with D(s;1) = 0, and (ii) D(t;s) =
1=D(s;t).
Suppose s ￿ t. Then (5.25) says that y received at time t is (weakly) preferred to x
received at time s if, and only if, the (undated) utility of x is less or equal to the (undated)
utility of y discounted from time t back to time s by the discount factor D(s;t). In this
case, part (i) of Proposition 34 implies the following. Fix the time, s, at which x is received.
Let the time, t, at which y is received, recede into the future. Then the value of the utility
30Assumption A1 to A6 of OM are plausible and clearly stated. We do not reproduce them here because
we only need the theorems that OM derive from them. Also note that D(s;t) here corresponds to ￿ (t;s)
in OM.
44of y, discounted back to time s, decreases. In the limit, as the receipt of y is inde￿nitely
postponed, the value of its utility, discounted back to time s, approaches zero. Part (ii)
of Proposition 34 says that compounding forward, from time s to time t, is the inverse of
discounting backwards from time t to time s.
For each r 2 [0;1), let ￿r be the restriction of ￿ to X ￿ [r;1), i.e., to times t ￿ r.
Thus, for r ￿ s and r ￿ t, (x;s) ￿r (y;t) if, and only if, (x;s) ￿ (y;t).
We can now point to the main di⁄erences between RT and OM.
First, note that U in Proposition 34 can take only positive values while v in (2.4)-
(2.5) takes both positive and negative values.31 To bypass this problem, we consider only
the domain of strictly positive gains. Let w0 be the reference point for wealth. Take
X = fw ￿ w0 : w > w0g = (0;1) and let ￿ satisfy the conditions of Proposition 34. Let
(U;D) be the representation of ￿ guaranteed by that Proposition.32
From subsection 2.3 recall that, for each r 2 [0;1), ￿w0;r is a complete transitive order
on (￿1;1) ￿ [r;1) and, hence, also on X ￿ [r;1). The second point we wish to make
is that, in general, ￿w0;r, unlike ￿r, is not the restriction to X ￿ [r;1) of some complete
binary relationship on X ￿ [0;1). Thus OM and RT are not compatible and neither is a
special case of the other.
Third, ￿w0;r is transitive while, in general, ￿r is not transitive. To elaborate this
point, consider (x;r), (y;s) and (z;t), where x;y;z 2 X and s;t 2 [r;1). Suppose
(x;r) ￿w0;r (y;s) and (y;s) ￿w0;r (z;t). Since ￿w0;r is transitive, we can conclude that
(x;r) ￿w0;r (z;t). Now, suppose that (x;r) ￿r (y;s) and (y;s) ￿r (z;t). Since ￿r is not,
in general, transitive, we cannot conclude that (x;r) ￿r (z;t).33 More generally, given
a compact subset C ￿ X ￿ [r;1), there is no guarantee in OM that it has a maximum
under ￿r (i.e., an m 2 C such that c ￿r m for all c 2 C). This, obviously, will cause great
di¢ culty for any economic theory formulated in the OM framework. On the other hand,
in RT theory, and if D is continuous, C will always have a maximum under ￿w0;r.
Fourth, and ￿nally, these problems with OM can all be resolved in the special case
where ￿ is transitive. But then ￿ would also be additive. In this case, OM would reduce
to the standard discounting model.
31Hence, in its present formulation, OM cannot explain gain-loss asymmetry. However, it can explain
the magnitude e⁄ect using the SIE value function (4.6).
32Two alternatives are possible. The ￿rst is to extend U to a function on (￿1;1) as follows. De￿ne
U (0) = 0 and, for x < 0, U (x) = ￿￿U (￿x). However, because of the separability assumption in OM,
D￿ = D+. The theory would then not be able to explain gain-loss asymmetry. The second alternative is
to work with two representations: (U+;D+) for gains and (U￿;D￿) for losses.
33As OM clearly explain, it is for this reason that we should think of D(s;t) in their theory as the
relative discount function between times s and t.
456. Summary and conclusions
The exponential discounting model is known to be subject to a range of anomalies. We try
to explain the 6 most important ones in one uni￿ed model. These anomalies are gain-loss
asymmetry, magnitude e⁄ect, common di⁄erence e⁄ect, delay-speedup asymmetry, non-
additivity of time discounting and apparent intransitivity of time preferences. Furthermore,
we show how recent work on intertemporal choice can be incorporated within our model.
Our uni￿ed model builds on the seminal works of Lowenstein and Prelec (1992) (LP);
Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) (PPL); Roelofsma and Read (2000), Read
(2001) and Scholten and Read (2006a) (RRS). We follow LP in taking prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as our underlying
decision theory. However, we depart from LP in having a reference point for time as well
as a reference point for wealth. We also allow for di⁄erent discount functions for gains and
losses. We call our uni￿ed theory, the reference-time theory of intertemporal choice, RT,
for short (section 2).
LP showed that a value function that can explain the magnitude e⁄ect must exhibit
increasing elasticity. We show that this is incompatible with several popular classes of
value functions including CARA (constant absolute risk aversion), CRRA (constant rela-
tive risk aversion), HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion), logarithmic and quadratic.
We develop a scheme for generating value functions that exhibit increasing elasticity, as
required to explain the magnitude e⁄ect. We call the simplest class that has this property
the class of simple increasing elasticity value functions (SIE). Each member of this class
is formed by a product of a HARA function and a CRRA function and, therefore, is quite
tractable (sections 3 and 4).
LP explained the gain-loss asymmetry (also known as the sign e⁄ect) by assuming
di⁄erent elasticities of the value function for gains and losses. We show that this implies
a variable coe¢ cient of loss aversion, in particular, a coe¢ cient of loss aversion that is
increasing with time (Example 4, section 4). We depart from LP in assuming constant
loss aversion, which is consistent with the evidence. We explain gain loss asymmetry by
assuming di⁄erent discount functions for gains and losses.
LP provided an axiomatic derivation of their generalized hyperbolic discount function
(which we called the LP-discount function). For this, they added the extra assumption of
linear delay to that of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect (also known as preference reversal or
the delay e⁄ect). While there is considerable empirical evidence for the common di⁄erence
e⁄ect, the assumption of linear delay is added purely for convenience. We extended their
work as follows. At the most general level, which requires neither linear delay nor the
common di⁄erence e⁄ect, we established our Representation Theorem 2 (Proposition 12).
Given an arbitrary delay function (De￿nition 7), Representation Theorem 2 characterizes
46all continuous discount functions with that delay function. We introduced a weaker notion
of subadditivity, which we called ￿-subadditivity (De￿nition 12). According to our Char-
acterization Theorem 4 (Proposition 21), preferences exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect
if, and only if, ￿-subadditivity holds. We also introduce a generalization of the concept of
linear delay of LP. We called this ￿-delay. Our Proposition 23 then showed that ￿-delay
implies the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. Using ￿-delay, we derived the RS-discount function
as an f-extension for a suitable function, f (Proposition 25). On the other hand, imposing
additivity, as well as ￿-delay, gives our Proposition 24. The special case of the latter with
￿ = 1 gives the LP-discount function. In particular, as with RRS, we can explain the com-
mon di⁄erence e⁄ect as due to either declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination
of both. However, our approach is more general because RT can also explain the common
di⁄erence e⁄ect as due to the presence of a small amount of irremovable uncertainty, as
in Halevy (2007), or as a consequence of multiple decision criteria, as in Manzini and
Mariotti (2006) (see section 5). Thus, RT can accommodate all the known explanations
of the common di⁄erence e⁄ect. In the spirit of RRS, we leave it to the empirical evidence
to select the correct explanation. We also showed that delay-speedup asymmetry follows
from our other assumptions (Proposition 30).
We showed how the RT theory can be extended to incorporate the attribute model of
Scholten and Read (2006b) (section 5). Also in section 5, we compared and contrasted
RT theory with Ok and Masatlioglu￿ s (2007) model of intransitive time preferences. We
showed that neither is a special case of the other. However, of the two, we believe that
the RT theory of this paper is the more tractable theory.
Work over the last two decades has shown the importance of each of the following ele-
ments in explaining intertemporal choice: (1) Prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting,
as in Lowenstein and Prelec (1992). (2) The interval discount function, as in Scholten
and Read (2006a). (3) Multiple criteria, on the lines of Manzini and Mariotti (2006). (4)
Uncertainty, as in Halevy (2007). We hope that this paper has shown how to incorporate
all these elements, along with a reference point for time and an SIE value function, into a
coherent and tractable model, which we called reference-time theory (RT).
7. Appendix: Proofs
The proofs of Propositions 26 and 27 are essentially adaptations of those in Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992) to the model of this paper.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let r 2 [0;1) and t 2 [r;1). Let ftng
1
n=1 be a sequence
in [r;1) converging to t. We want to show that fD(r;tn)g
1
n=1 converges to D(r;t).
It is su¢ cient to show that any monotone subsequence of fD(r;tn)g
1
n=1 converges to
D(r;t). In particular, let fD(r;tni)g
1





i=1 is bounded below by D(r;t), it must converge to, say, q, where
D(r;t) ￿ q ￿ D(r;tni), for all i. Since D is onto, there is a p 2 [r;1) such that
D(r;p) = q. Moreover, tni ￿ p ￿ t, for each i. Suppose D(r;t) < q. Then tni < p,
for each i. Hence also tni < t, for each i. But this cannot be, since ftnig
1
i=1, being a
subsequence of the convergent sequence ftng
1
n=1, must also converge to the same limit, t.
Hence, D(r;t) = q. Hence, fD(r;tni)g
1
i=1 converges to D(r;t). Similarly, we can show that
any increasing subsequence of fD(r;tn)g
1
n=1 converges to D(r;t). Hence, fD(r;tn)g
1
n=1
converges to D(r;t). Hence, D(r;t) is continuous in t. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: It is straightforward to check that each of (2.12), (2.14),
(2.15) and (5.13) is a continuous discount function in the sense of De￿nition 2. It is also
straightforward to check that (2.13) is a discount function. The reason the latter is not a
continuous discount function is that lim
t!0+D(0;t) < D(0;0). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3 (Time sensitivity): Let D(r;t) be a continuous discount
function and r ￿ 0. Suppose 0 < x ￿ y. From (2.4) and (2.5), it follows that 0 < v (x) ￿
v (y) and, hence, 0 <
v(x)
v(y) ￿ 1. Since, by De￿nition 2(i), D(r;t) : [r;1)
onto ! (0;1], it
follows that
v(x)
v(y) = D(r;t) for some t 2 [r;1). A similar argument applies if y < x < 0.
￿
Proof of Proposition 4 (Existence of present values): Let r ￿ t and y ￿ 0. Then,
0 < D(r;t) ￿ 1. Hence, 0 = v (0) ￿ v (y)D(r;t) ￿ v (y). Since v is continuous and
strictly increasing, it follows that v (y)D(r;t) = v (x) for some x 2 [0;y]. Similarly, if
y ￿ 0, then v (y)D(r;t) = v (x) for some x 2 [y;0]. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (a) Suppose that D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) for some strictly
decreasing real valued function, ’ : [0;1) ! (0;1]. We ￿rst check that D satis￿es all
parts of De￿nition 2. Clearly, D(r;t) is strictly decreasing in t and strictly increasing in
r. Let r 2 [0;1). D(r;r) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(r) = 1. Hence, for ￿xed r 2 [0;1), t 7! D(r;t)
maps [r;1) into (0;1]. Next, let t 2 [0;1). D(t;t) = [’(t)]
￿1 ’(t) = 1. Hence, for ￿xed
t 2 [0;1), r 7￿! D(r;t) maps [0;t] into (0;1]. Thus De￿nition 2(ii) also holds. Hence, D
is a discount function. If, in addition, ’(0) = 1, then D(0;t) = [’(0)]
￿1 ’(t) = ’(t).
Now suppose that ’ is onto. Let p 2 (0;1]. Hence, also, ’(r)p 2 (0;1]. Since ’ is onto
(0;1], we get ’(t) = ’(r)p for some t 2 [0;1). But ’(t) = ’(r)p ￿ ’(r). Hence, t ￿ r.
We also have D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(r)p = p. Hence, for each r 2 [0;1),
t 7￿! D(r;t) maps [r;1) onto (0;1]. Thus De￿nition 2(i) holds with ￿ into￿replaced by
￿ onto￿ . Hence, D is a continuous discount function. Since ’ : [0;1)
onto ! (0;1] is strictly
decreasing, we must have ’(0) = 1. Hence, D(0;t) = [’(0)]
￿1 ’(t) = ’(t).
For all r, s and t, D(r;s)D(s;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(s)[’(s)]
￿1 ’(t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) =
D(r;t). Hence, D is additive.
(b) Suppose that D is an additive discount function. Then, for all r, s, t, where
480 ￿ r ￿ s ￿ t, D(r;s)D(s;t) = D(r;t). From this, it follows that, for any s and any t
(0 ￿ s ￿ t):
D(r;t)
D(r;s) = D(s;t), which is independent of r, for all r 2 [0;s]. Similarly, for any
r and any s (0 ￿ r ￿ s):
D(r;t)
D(s;t) = D(r;s), which is independent of t, for all t 2 [s;1). This
can only hold if D(r;t) = F (r)￿(t), for all r and t (0 ￿ r ￿ t). In particular, F (r)￿(r) =
D(r;r) = 1. Hence, F (r) = [￿(r)]
￿1. Hence, D(r;t) = [￿(r)]
￿1 ￿(t). Set ’(t) =
￿(t)=￿(0). Then D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t). In particular, D(0;t) = [’(0)]
￿1 ’(t) = ’(t).
Hence, ’ is a strictly decreasing function from [0;1) into (0;1]. If D is continuous, so
that D(0;t) is onto, then ’ is also onto. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: Exponential: ’(t) = e￿￿t. PPL: ’(0) = 1 and ’(t) =
e￿￿￿￿t for t > 0. LP: ’(t) = (1 + ￿t)
￿
￿
￿. Generalized RS: ’(t) = e￿Q[w(t)]. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7 (Invariance to the choice of reference time):
((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿w0;r ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)),
, Vr ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿ Vr ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)),
, D(0;r)Vr ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿ D(0;r)Vr ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)),
, D(0;r)￿
m










i=1v (xi)D(0;si) ￿ ￿
n
i=1v (yi)D(0;ti), by additivity,
, V0 ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿ V0 ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)),
, ((x1;s1);(x2;s2);:::;(xm;sm)) ￿w0;0 ((y1;t1);(y2;t2);:::;(yn;tn)). ￿
To facilitate the proof of Propositions 8, below, and 22, later, we ￿rst establish Lemmas
1 and 2.
Lemma 1 : Let x ￿ 0 and y ￿ 0. Then:
(a) ￿ ￿ 1 ) x￿ + y￿ ￿ (x + y)
￿.
(b) 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 ) x￿ + y￿ ￿ (x + y)
￿.
Proof of Lemma 1: Clearly, the results hold for x = 0. Suppose x > 0. Let z =
y
x
and f (z) = (1 + z)




, for z > 0.
Suppose ￿ ￿ 1. Then f0 (z) ￿ 0. Since f is continuous, it follows that f (z) ￿ 0 for z ￿ 0.
Part (a) follows from this. Now suppose 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Then f0 (z) ￿ 0. Since f is continuous,
it follows that f (z) ￿ 0 for z ￿ 0. Part (b) follows from this. ￿
Lemma 2 : Let ￿ > 0, 0 ￿ s < t and r > 0. Let f (r) = (t + r)
￿ ￿ (s + r)
￿ ￿ (t￿ ￿ s￿).
Then:
(a) ￿ > 1 ) f (r) > 0.
(b) 0 < ￿ < 1 ) f (r) < 0.
49Proof of Lemma 2: Clearly, f (0) = 0. Also, f0 (r) = ￿
￿
(t + r)
￿￿1 ￿ (s + r)
￿￿1￿
. If
￿ > 1, then f0 (r) > 0 for r > 0. Since f is continuous, it follows that f (r) > 0 for r > 0.
This establishes part (a). If 0 < ￿ < 1, then f0 (r) < 0 for r > 0. Since f is continuous, it
follows that f (r) < 0 for r > 0. This establishes part (b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 8: (a) Suppose 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Let 0 ￿ r < s < t. From (2.15), we
get:
















































































(b) It is su¢ cient to give an example. Let ￿ = ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 2. Hence, D(0;1)D(1;2) =
4￿￿ > 5￿￿ = D(0;2). Hence, for ￿ = ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 2, D cannot be additive or subad-
ditive. However, for the same parameter values, we have D(0;10)D(10;20) = 10201￿￿ <
401￿￿ = D(0;20). Hence, D cannot be supper additive either.34
(c) Let 0 ￿ s < t. (ii) is obvious from inspecting (2.15). Let r > 0. (iii) For ￿ > 1,
Lemma 2(a) gives D(s + r;t + r) = f1 + ￿[(t + r)










= D(s;t). (i) For 0 < ￿ < 1, Lemma 2(b) gives D(s + r;t + r) = f1 + ￿[(t + r)










￿ = D(s;t). ￿
Proof of Proposition 9 (Properties of a delay function): Let D be a discount
function and ￿ and ￿ two corresponding delay functions. Let s;t 2 [0;1). Then
D(0;￿(s;t)) = D(0;s)D(0;t) = D(0;￿(s;t)). Since D(0;r) is strictly decreasing in
r, we must have ￿(s;t) = ￿(s;t). This establishes (a). Using De￿nition 2, it is straight-
forward to check that properties (b) to (d) follow from De￿nition 7. Now, suppose v (x)
= v (y)D(0;t). Multiply both sides by D(0;s) to get v (x)D(0;s) = v (y)D(0;s)D(0;t)
= v (y)D(0;￿(s;t)). Conversely, suppose v (x)D(0;s) = v (y)D(0;￿(s;t)). Then
v (x)D(0;s) = v (y)D(0;s)D(0;t). Since D(0;s) > 0, we can cancel it to get v (x)
= v (y)D(0;t). This establishes (e) and completes the proof. ￿
34Other examples can be given to show that there is nothing special about r = 0, ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1, or
￿ = 2, as long as ￿ > 1.
50Proof of Proposition 10 (Existence of a delay function): Let D be a continu-
ous discount function. Let s;t 2 [0;1). Then D(0;s);D(0;t) 2 (0;1]. Hence also
D(0;s)D(0;t) 2 (0;1]. Since r 7! D(0;r) is onto (0;1], there is some T 2 [0;1) such
that D(0;s)D(0;t) = D(0;T). Since D(0;r) is strictly decreasing in r, this T is unique.
Set T = ￿(s;t). The function, ￿(s;t), thus de￿ned, is a delay function corresponding to
D. ￿
Proof of Proposition 11: (Representation Theorem 1) Let ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. It
is easy to verify that D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿ is an (￿;￿)-representation of the discount
function D(r;t) if, and only if,   (t) = 1
￿ [D(0;t)]
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 1. From this, using De￿nition
2, it is straightforward to verify that part (a) holds. It follows that the inverse of  
exists and  
￿1 : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing with   (0) = 0, this establishes
part (b). We now turn to part (c). We have [1 + ￿  (￿(s;t))]
￿
￿
￿ = D(0;￿(s;t)) =
D(0;s)D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (s)]
￿
￿
￿ [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿




Hence, [1 + ￿  (￿(s;t))]
￿
￿
￿ = [1 + ￿  (s) + ￿  (t) + ￿2  (s)  (t)]
￿
￿
￿. From the latter it
follows that   (￿(s;t)) =   (s)+  (t)+￿  (s)  (t). Hence, ￿(s;t) =  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)].
￿
Proof of Proposition 12 (Representation Theorem 2): Let
  : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) be strictly increasing (hence,   (0) = 0), (7.1)
and let
￿(s;t) =  
￿1 (  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)), ￿ > 0. (7.2)
Let D be a continuous discount function with delay function, ￿. Then
D(0;s)D(0;t) = D(0;￿(s;t)), s ￿ 0, t ￿ 0. (7.3)




￿1 (  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t))
￿
, s ￿ 0, t ￿ 0. (7.4)
From (7.1), we get that  
￿1 exists and  
￿1 : [0;1)
onto ! [0;1) is strictly increasing with
 
￿1 (0) = 0. Bear these facts in mind for when the functions G and h are de￿ned, below
((7.7) and (7.10)).
Let
X = 1 + ￿  (s), Y = 1 + ￿  (t). (7.5)
Hence
  (s) =
X ￿ 1
￿
,   (t) =
Y ￿ 1
￿





















































From (7.4), (7.6), (7.7), (7.8)






























= G(X)G(Y ). (7.9)
De￿ne35 the function h : [0;1) ! (0;1) by
h(y) = G(e
y);y ￿ 0 (7.10)
Hence, and in the light of De￿nition 2(i), h satis￿es36:
h : [0;1) ! (0;1) is strictly decreasing and h(x + y) = h(x)h(y). (7.11)
As is well known, see for example Corollary 1.4.11 in Eichhorn (1978) or Theorem 1, page
38, of Aczel (1966), the unique solution to (7.11) is the exponential function
h(y) = e
cy, y ￿ 0, c < 0, (7.12)








G(Y ) = Y
c
35It is tempting, at this stage, to take a shortcut and conclude, from the fact that G(XY ) = G(X)G(Y ),
that, necessarily, G(X) = Xc. However, the relevant theorem (Theorem 1.9.13 in Eichhorn (1978) or
Theorem 3, page 41, in Aczel (1966)) requires that G(X) be de￿ned for all X > 0. However,  
￿1 (t) is
not de￿ned for t < 0 and, hence, G(X) is not de￿ned for X < 1.














￿1 (  (t))
￿
= [1 + ￿  (t)]
c
D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
c . (7.13)
Let
￿ = ￿￿c, (7.14)
(7.13), (7.14) give
D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿
￿ , ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, t ￿ 0, (7.15)
where ￿ > 0 because ￿ > 0 and c < 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 13 (Extension Theorem 1): (a) Let f and g be extension
functions corresponding to the discount function D. Let r 2 [0;1) and t 2 [r;1). Then,
by De￿nition 11(ii), D(0;f (r;t)) = D(r;t) = D(0;g (r;t)). Since D(r;s) is strictly
decreasing in s, it follows that f (r;t) = g (r;t). Hence, f = g. (b) We have D(0;t) =
D(0;f (0;t)). Since D(0;s) is strictly decreasing in s, it follows that f (0;t) = t. We
also have D(0;f (r;r)) = D(r;r) = 1 = D(0;0), i.e., D(0;f (r;r)) = D(0;0). Again,
since D(0;t) is strictly decreasing in t, it follows that f (r;r) = 0. Since D(0;f (r;t))
= D(r;t) and D(r;t) is strictly decreasing in t, it follows that f (r;t) must be strictly
increasing in t. Since D(r;t) is strictly increasing in r, it follows that f (r;t) must be
strictly decreasing in r. This completes the proof that f is an extension function. (c)
Since D(r;t) = D(0;f (r;t)), it follows that v (x) = v (y)D(r;t) if, and only if, v (x) =
v (y)D(0;f (r;t)). ￿
Proof of Proposition 14 (Extension Theorem 2): Let r 2 [0;1) and t 2 [r;1). Then
D(r;t) 2 (0;1]. Since D is a continuous discount function, it follows that s 7￿! D(0;s)
is onto (0;1]. Hence, for some T 2 (0;1], D(r;t) = D(0;T). Since D(r;s) is strictly
decreasing in s, it follows that this T is unique. Set f (r;t) = T. The function, f,
thus de￿ned has the property D(r;t) = D(0;f (r;t)). Hence, f is an extension function
corresponding to D. Let r 2 [0;1). Let t 2 [0;1). Then D(0;t) 2 (0;1]. Since, D is a
continuous discount function, it maps [r;1) onto (0;1]. Hence D(r;s) = D(0;t), for some
s 2 [r;1). But since f is an extension function corresponding to D, we have D(r;s) =
D(0;f (r;s)). Hence, D(0;f (r;s)) = D(0;t). Since D(0;q) is strictly decreasing in q, it
follows that f (r;s) = t. Hence, t 7￿! f (r;t) maps [r;1) onto [0;1). ￿
Proof of Proposition 15 (Extension Theorem 3): (a) Since f : ￿ ! [0;1) and
’ : [0;1) ! (0;1], it follows that ’ ￿ f : ￿ ! (0;1]. Let r 2 [0;1). Then t 7! ’(f (r;t))
maps [r;1) into (0;1] and is strictly decreasing with D(r;r) = ’(f (r;r)) = ’(0) = 1.
Let t 2 [0;1). Then r 7! ’(f (r;t)) maps [0;t] into (0;1] and is strictly decreasing.
53Thus, D(r;t) = ’(f (r;t)) satis￿es all parts of De￿nition 2 and, hence, is a discount
function. (b) D(0;f (r;t)) = ’(f (0;f (r;t))) = ’(f (r;t)) = D(r;t). Hence, f is the
extension function corresponding to D and D(r;t) is the f-extension of D(0;t). (c) Let
r 2 [0;1). Let p 2 (0;1]. Since ’ is onto, there exists t 2 [0;1) such that p = ’(t).
Since s 7! f (r;s) maps [r;1) onto [0;1), there exists s 2 [r;1) such that f (r;s) = t.
Hence, D(r;s) = ’(f (r;s)) = ’(t) = p. Hence, s 7! D(r;s) maps [r;1) onto [0;1).
Hence, D is a continuous discount function. ￿
Proof of Proposition 16 (Characterization Theorem 1): Let D be a continuous
discount function. Then, by Representation Theorem 1 (Proposition 11) and Extension
Theorem 2 (Proposition 14) D(r;t) = D(0;f (r;t)) = [1 + ￿  (f (r;t))]
￿
￿
￿, where ￿ > 0,
￿ > 0,   is a continuous seed function and f is a continuous extension function. Conversely,
if D(r;t) = [1 + ￿  (f (r;t))]
￿
￿
￿, where ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0,   is a continuous seed function and
f is a continuous extension function, then D satis￿es all the conditions of De￿nition 2, with
￿ onto￿replacing ￿ into￿in part (i). Hence, D is a continuous discount function. Uniqueness
of f follows from Extension Theorem 1 (Proposition 13). ￿
Proof of Proposition 17 (Characterization Theorem 2): Follows from De￿nition 6
and Characterization Theorem 1 (Proposition 16). ￿





































, which is additive, by Proposition 5(aiii). Conversely, suppose D is addi-
tive. Then, by Proposition 5(b), D(r;t) = [’(r)]
￿1 ’(t) for some strictly decreasing real
valued function, ’ : [0;1)




’(t) = D(0;t) = [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿











1 + ￿  (f (r;t)) =
1+￿ (t)







Proof of Proposition 19: All the claims can be veri￿ed by straightforward calcu-
lations. However, when dealing with PPL, do not use Proposition 11, as PPL is not
continuous. So, for example, instead of using part b of Proposition 11, check directly that
D(0;s)D(0;t) = D(0;￿(s;t)). ￿
Proof of Proposition 20 (Representation Theorem 3): Since   (0) = 0 and   is
strictly increasing (Proposition 11a), it follows that   (t) > 0 , t > 0. Let s > 0 and t > 0,
then D(0;s)D(0;t) < D(0;s + t) , [1 + ￿  (s)]
￿
￿
￿ [1 + ￿  (t)]
￿
￿




, [1 + ￿  (s)][1 + ￿  (t)] > 1 + ￿  (s + t) ,   (s + t) <   (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)
, s + t <  
￿1 [  (s) +   (t) + ￿  (s)  (t)] , s + t < ￿(s;t). From this chain it follows
that (c) , (a) , (b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 21 (Characterization Theorem4): Assume  + is ￿+-subadditive.
Let 0 < x < y, v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t) and s > 0. Then 0 < v (x) < v (y). It follows
54that D+ (0;t) < 1 and, hence, t > 0. From Representation Theorem 3(c) (Proposition
20), it follows that D+ (0;s)D+ (0;t) < D+ (0;s + t). Hence, v (y)D+ (0;t)D+ (0;s) <
v (y)D+ (0;s + t). Hence, v (x)D+ (0;s) < v (y)D+ (0;s + t). Hence, the common di⁄er-
ence e⁄ect holds for gains.
Conversely, assume that the common di⁄erence e⁄ect holds for gains. Let s > 0 and
t > 0. Hence, 0 < s < s + t. Hence, by Proposition 2.10, for some x, 0 ￿ x ￿ 1,
v (x) = v (1)D+ (0;t). Hence, x > 0. Hence, v (x)D+ (0;s) < v (1)D+ (0;s + t). Hence,
v (1)D+ (0;s)D+ (0;t) < v (1)D+ (0;s + t). Hence, D+ (0;s)D+ (0;t) < D+ (0;s + t).
From Representation Theorem 3 (Proposition 20), it follows that  + is ￿+-subadditive.
Hence, preferences exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect for gains if, and only if, the
seed function for gains,  +, is ￿+-subadditive. A similar argument shows that preferences
exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect for losses if, and only if, the seed function for losses,
 ￿, is ￿￿-subadditive. ￿
Proof of Proposition 22: Let  + (t) = t￿+, where 0 < ￿+ ￿ 1. Then, for s > 0
and t > 0,  + (s + t) = (s + t)
￿+ ￿ t￿+ + s￿+ < s￿+ + t￿+ + ￿+s￿+t￿+ =  + (s)+  + (t)+
￿+ + (s) + (t). Hence, by Characterization Theorem 4 (Proposition 21), preferences
that exhibit ￿-delay (De￿nition 13), also exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect for gains.
Similarly, they exhibit the common di⁄erence e⁄ect for losses. ￿
Proof of Proposition 23: Let preferences with continuous discount function D+
(gains) and D￿ (losses) exhibit ￿-delay. Then, by De￿nition 13, their respective delay
functions are ￿+ (s;t) = (s￿+ + t￿+ + ￿+s￿+t￿+)
1
￿+, ￿+ > 0, 0 < ￿+ ￿ 1 and ￿￿ (s;t) =
(s￿￿ + t￿￿ + ￿￿s￿￿t￿￿)
1
￿￿, ￿￿ > 0, 0 < ￿￿ ￿ 1. Hence, by Representation Theorem
2 (Proposition 12), we must have D+ (0;t) = (1 + ￿+t￿+)
￿
￿+
￿+, for some ￿+ > 0, and
D￿ (0;t) = (1 + ￿￿t￿￿)
￿
￿￿
￿￿, for some ￿￿ < 0. ￿




￿+, for some ￿+ > 0, and D￿ (0;t) = (1 + ￿￿t￿￿)
￿
￿￿
￿￿, for some ￿￿ <

















for some ￿+ > 0, and D￿ (0;t) = (1 + ￿￿t￿￿)
￿
￿￿
￿￿, for some ￿￿ < 0. Hence, D+ (r;t) =






























To facilitate what follows, we de￿ne two functions, e v+ and e v￿, associated with the
value function (2.6),
55De￿nition 15 :
e v+ (x) = lnv (e
x), ￿ 1 < x < 1,
e v￿ (x) = ln(￿v (￿e
x)), ￿ 1 < x < 1. (7.16)
Proof of Proposition 26: Suppose 0 < x < y. By Proposition 3, v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t)
for some t 2 [0;1). Hence,
v(x)
v(y) = D+ (0;t). By assumption A1, v (￿x) > v (￿y)D￿ (0;t).
Since ￿y < 0, it follows that v (￿y) < 0 and, hence,
v(￿x)










lny￿lnx . Letting e x = lnx and e y = lny, we get
e v+(e y)￿e v+(e x)
e y￿e x <
e v￿(e y)￿e v￿(e x)




de x , from which it follows
that ￿v (x) ￿ ￿v (￿x). ￿
Proof of Proposition 27: Let
0 < x < y (or y < x < 0). (7.17)
By Proposition 3, there is a time, t, such that the consumer is indi⁄erent between
receiving the increment x now and receiving the increment y, t-periods from now. Then,
letting v be the value function and D￿ the discount function, we get
v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t) (v (x) = v (y)D￿ (0;t)). (7.18)
Let
a > 1, (7.19)
then the magnitude e⁄ect, assumption A2, predicts that











Since y;a are positive (respectively, y is negative), it follows that ay, and hence, v (ay) are





















v(ay);0 < x <
y;a > 1 (the ￿rst < should be >)
56Start with the case 0 < x < y. Since a > 0;x > 0 and y > 0, and since v (0) = 0 and v
is strictly increasing, it follows that v (x);v (y);v (ax) and v (ay) are all positive. Hence,
we can take their logs. Let e x = lnx, e y = lny, e a = lna (hence, x = ee x, y = ee y, a = ee a).




taking logs, and recalling that the logarithmic function is strictly increasing and changes
multiplication to addition, (7.23) gives:





































Since e v (x) = lnv (ex), we get
e v (e y + e a) ￿ e v (e x + e a) > [e v (e y) ￿ e v (e x)],
e v (e y + e a) ￿ e v (e x + e a) ￿ [e v (e y) ￿ e v (e x)] > 0. (7.24)
Take ￿x > 0, e a = ￿x, e y = e x + ￿x, then (7.24) gives:
e v (e x + 2￿x) ￿ e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ [e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ e v (e x)] > 0,
e v (e x + 2￿x) ￿ e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ [e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ e v (e x)]
(￿x)


















































e v(e x+2￿x)￿e v(e x+￿x)
￿x ￿ lim
￿x!0











e v(e x+2￿x)￿e v(e x+￿x)
￿x ￿











e v (e x + 2￿x) ￿ e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ [e v (e x + ￿x) ￿ e v (e x)]
(￿x)
2 . (7.26)
57Since the limit of a converging sequence of positive numbers in non-negative, we get, from



















If ￿(x) were constant on some non-empty open interval, then the value function would take
the form v (x) = cx￿ on that interval, and subproportionality. (7.23) would be violated.
Hence ￿0 (x) > 0 almost everywhere. Thus ￿(x) increases with x.
Now consider the case y < x < 0. Then (7.23) still holds. But now we de￿ne e x =





. As before, (7.24) holds and v0 (x) > 0
almost everywhere. Thus ￿(x) increases with x.
It then follows that the value function is more elastic for outcomes that are larger in
absolute magnitude. ￿














If x > 0 then v(x) > 0, v00 (x) < 0, ￿0
v (x) ￿ 0. From (7.27) it follows that, necessarily,
￿v < 1.
If x < 0 then v(x) < 0, v00 (x) > 0, ￿0
v (x) ￿ 0. From (7.27), it follows that, again, ￿v < 1.
￿
Proof of Proposition 29: Suppose 0 < x < y. By Proposition 3, v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t)
for some t 2 [0;1). By A1, v (￿x) > v (￿y)D￿ (0;t). Hence, from A6, ￿￿v (x) >
￿￿v (y)D￿ (0;t). Hence, v (y)D￿ (0;t) > v (x) = v (y)D+ (0;t). It follows that D￿ (0;t) >






v(y). Finally, ￿v (￿x) = ￿x









dx = ￿v (x). ￿
Proof of Proposition 30: Consider the two consumption streams: ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t))
and ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t)), where c > 0. If the consumer receives ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t))
when he was expecting ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t)) then, according to prospect theory, he
codes the postponement of c as a loss in period 2 but a gain in period 3. According
to (2.9), V0 ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t)) = v (0)D+ (0;0) + v (￿c)D￿ (0;s) + v (c)D+ (0;s + t)
= ￿￿v (c)D￿ (0;s)+v (c)D+ (0;s + t), where the last inequality comes from v (0) = 0 and
v (￿c) = ￿￿v (c). On the other hand, if the consumer receives ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t))
when he was expecting ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t)), he codes the bringing forward of con-
sumption as a gain in period 2 but a loss in period 3. Hence, V0 ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t))
58= v (0)D+ (0;0)+v (c)D+ (0;s)+v (￿c)D￿ (0;s + t) = v (c)D+ (0;s)￿￿v (c)D￿ (0;s + t).
We thus have: V0 ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t)) + V0 ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t)) = v (c)D+ (0;s) ￿
￿v (c)D￿ (0;s + t)￿￿v (c)D￿ (0;s)+v (c)D+ (0;s + t) = ￿[￿(D￿ (0;s + t) + D￿ (0;s)) ￿ (D+ (0;s) + D+ (0;s + t))]v (c) <
0, since v (c) > 0, D￿ (0;s + t)+D￿ (0;s) ￿ D+ (0;s + t)+D+ (0;s) (Proposition 29) and
￿ > 1 (A6). Hence, V0 ((0;0);(c;s);(0;s + t)) < ￿V0 ((0;0);(0;s);(c;s + t)). ￿
Proof of Proposition 31: The result is obvious for the CRRA and CARA classes,
from (3.1) and (3.3), respectively. We shall concentrate on giving the proof for the HARA
class (3.2). For the remaining two classes: the logarithmic (3.4) and the quadratic (3.5),





, y = ￿x




￿v is decreasing if, and only if, f (y) is decreasing. Let g (y) = ￿2￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿￿y ￿
￿(￿ + y)
1￿￿, then it is straightforward to show that f0 (y) < 0 if, and only if, g (y) > 0.
Simple calculations show that g (0) = 0, g0 (0) = 0 and g00 (y) = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + y)
￿￿￿1 > 0.
Hence, g (y) > 0 for y > 0. Hence f and, thus, also ￿v, is decreasing. ￿
Proof of Proposition 32: Follows from (3.11) by direct calculation. ￿
Proof of Proposition 33: These can be veri￿ed by direct calculation using (4.1),
(4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6). ￿
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